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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet  Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(“ICANN”) has failed with i ts experiment in novel forms of govern-
ance and representation of the global Internet user community.
1 How-
ever, ICANN will, at the very least, warrant a footnote in the history 
books. Its inception in the late 1990s as the Internet morphed from a 
limited network of academics, technologists, civil servants, and other 
trailblazers into a widely used and incessantly discussed global phe-
nomenon placed ICANN in an intriguing role. At a fascinating mo-
ment in history, ICANN’s mandate to coordinate a key aspect of the 
Internet’s operations made it the first substantial  Internet institution 
with a global reach.
2 ICANN may also be worth chronicling as a sui 
generis institution that was at once obscure and a lightning rod for 
attention and criticism
3 from government entities, legal scholars, and 
                                                                                                    
1. See, e.g., David J. Farber et al., Overcoming ICANN: Forging Better Paths for the 
Internet (Mar. 18, 2002), at http://www.pfir.org/statements/icann (describing ICANN as a 
“failed experiment”). This notion of the failure of ICANN’s experiment in “democratizing” 
its decision-making process is well described. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, ICANN and the Con-
cept of Democratic Deficit, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1149 (2003). 
2. See, e.g., David Post, Cyberspace’s Constitutional Moment, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, 
Nov. 1998,  at 117,  available at  http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/ 
DNSGovernance.htm.  
3. Concern about the ICANN structure began even before ICANN got started in earnest. 
See Letter from J. Beckwith Burr, Associate Administrator of National Telecommunications 
& Information Administration for International Affairs, to Dr. Herb Schorr, Executive Di-No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  411 
 
Internet users. These parties and many others have struggled with the 
questions of who should govern the technical  architecture of the 
Internet, and how to do so legitimately.
4 If the 2003 reform process 
continues on its desultory path, or if time runs out on ICANN’s exten-
sion of its Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) with the U .S. 
Department of Commerce, ICANN may well be remembered as a case 
study in organizational self-destruction.
5  
ICANN’s ambitious experiment was to create its own legitimacy 
by harnessing the power of the Internet’s potential for openness and 
representation. From the perspective of some stakeholders and 
onlookers, ICANN’s central mission was to use the technologies, 
power, and attractiveness of the Internet
6 to experiment in democratic 
                                                                                                    
rector, USC Information Services Institute (Oct. 20, 1998), at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
ntiahome/press/icann102098.htm (“[T]he public comments received on the ICANN submis-
sion reflect significant concerns about substantive and operational aspects of ICANN.”). 
4. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 
(2000). 
5. ICANN’s woes, circa 2004, are legion. A series of nations, including Brazil, India, 
South Africa, China, and Saudi Arabia “are growing dissatisfied with the workings of Cali-
fornia-based ICANN” and have pushed for the intervention of the U.N. in the Internet gov-
ernance process. Frances Williams, Plan for UN to Run Internet “Will be Shelved,” FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003. Aside from this collateral attack by several governments on ICANN 
and the perpetual dispute over representation, a distributed denial-of-service attack on Octo-
ber 21, 2002, in which seven of the thirteen DNS root servers were cut off from the rest of 
the Internet, raised questions about ICANN’s fitness to carry out its core mission (which has 
ordinarily not been a major source of controversy). See Richard Korman, Karl Aurbach: 
“ICANN Out of Control,”  O’R EILLY  NETWORK  (Dec. 5, 2002),  at 
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/12/05/karl.html. The U.S. General Accounting 
Office issued a report in Fall 2002, critical of ICANN’s steps toward greater security protec-
tions for the root servers. See Hearing on ICANN Governance: Hearing before the Sub-
comm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Transp., & Sci., 107th 
Cong. (2002) (statement of Peter Guerro, Director, Physical Infrastructure Group, General 
Accounting Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02805t.pdf.  In addition, 
the departures of key ICANN staff in recent years, in particular CEO Stuart Lynn and Chief 
Policy Officer Andrew McLaughlin, have led to a great deal of criticism. See, e.g., Patrick 
Thibodeau, Future of ICANN Remains Uncertain, COMPUTERWORLD (June 17, 2002), at 
http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/government/policy/story/0,10801,72034,
00.html. But see Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Com-
merce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Sept. 17, 2002) 
[hereinafter  MoU 2002],  available at  http://www.icann.org/general/amend5- 
jpamou-19sep02.htm (extending by one year the agreement between ICANN and the U.S. 
Department of Commerce); Statement of Department of Commerce Regarding Extension of 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers [hereinafter  Statement Regarding MoU],  at  http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
ntiahome/domainname/agreements/sepstatement_09162003.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004) 
(stating reasons for extension). 
6. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS 
PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 57–59 (1999) 
(discussing the  Internet’s potential to play a role in  disintermediating politics); Alinta 
Thornton, Does Internet Create Democracy? (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Tech-
nology, Sydney) (2002), at http://www.zip.com.au/~athornto; Mark Poster, CyberDemoc-
racy: Internet and the Public Sphere  (1995), at http://www.humanities.uci.edu/mposter/ 
writings/democ.html; Power to the People, ECONOMIST, Jan. 23, 2003, at 17, available at 
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1534259 (describing  the 412   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
governance on a global scale.
7 It sought to empower the Internet user 
community, including the private sector, to manage a system neces-
sary for the stable operation of the Internet.
8 Its novel, though ulti-
mately flawed, structure has enabled a coalition of private-sector 
interest groups to manage the d omain name system (“DNS”) with 
broad input from individual users
 and limited but growing input from 
nation states.
9 However, ICANN has failed to attract and incorporate 
sufficient public involvement to serve as the blueprint for building 
legitimacy through the Internet. Those who sought through ICANN to 
prove a point about Internet and democracy have misplaced their em-
phasis, because ICANN’s narrow technical mandate has not lent itself 
to broad-based public involvement in the decision-making process.  
Since its formation, ICANN has faced an uphill battle to establish 
the legitimacy of  its  authority.
10  Its experimental decision-making 
structure grows out of its brief, unusual history and from the traditions 
of informal technical standards-setting bodies. E stablished by a few 
individuals, a few private standards bodies, several corporations, and 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, ICANN was founded in 1998 as a 
not-for-profit corporation based in California, USA.
11  ICANN has 
sought to legitimate itself as an open and representative body, striving 
toward a bottom-up decision-making process grounded in consensus 
                                                                                                    
expectations that the Internet would transform politics, and the disappointment in the reality 
that has ensued); COMMON CAUSE  & THE CTR. FOR  DEMOCRACY & TECH., ICANN’S 
GLOBAL  ELECTIONS:  ON THE  INTERNET,  FOR THE  INTERNET  (Mar. 2000),  at 
http://www.commoncause.org/icann/introduction.htm#1.1.  But s ee  CASS  SUNSTEIN, 
REPUBLIC.COM (2001). These writings do not necessarily focus on ICANN, but rather on 
the broader argument regarding the role of information and communications technologies in 
strengthening or weakening democratic institutions.  
7. There is substantial debate as to whether ICANN is in fact engaged in “governance” or 
in something else. There is a related debate as to whether ICANN makes “policy.” See infra 
note 113 and accompanying text.  
8. See, for example, the departing statement of ICANN board member Masanobu Katoh, 
who said that ICANN’s participants should believe that ICANN can be a twenty-first cen-
tury model for international organizations dealing with technology and new economy. Tho-
mas Roessler, Carthage: A Good Board Meeting (Oct. 31, 2003), at http://log.does-not-
exist.org/archives/2003/10/31/929_carthage_a_good_board_meeting.html. 
9. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Cukier, Why the Internet Must Regulate Itself, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 
31, 2003, at 13, available at http://www.cukier.com/writings/FToct03.html (observing that 
ICANN has enabled community-driven self-regulation and  describing the importance of 
such a concept). 
10. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 187 (“If ICANN is to establish its legitimacy, it must 
be able to answer the charge that its exercise of authority is inconsistent with our ordinary 
understandings about public power and public policymaking.”). Professor Weinberg’s arti-
cle in some respects is what prompted the close data analysis involved in developing this 
Article. He posits that ICANN functions like an administrative agency, but without the 
backstop of judicial review when the agency’s decisions go awry. Our review of how the 
board took account of user input focuses primarily on the period after publication of Profes-
sor Weinberg’s piece, and largely supports his theory.  
11. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES 
AND NUMBERS (revised Nov. 21, 1998) [hereinafter ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION], avail-
able at http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm. No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  413 
 
and inclusion.
12 The corporation was charged with the seemingly lim-
ited role of technical coordination of the Internet for the benefit of the 
Internet community as a whole.
13 To carry out this mandate, ICANN 
has involved hundreds of thousands of people around the world, much 
in the same manner as its predecessor organizations did.
14 Also, in the 
fall of 2000, ICANN held a global, Internet-based election to elect 
five of its nineteen directors.
15 However, since that time, a committee 
of ICANN participants, as well as other outside observers who have 
conducted major studies of that election, have questioned how the 
organization’s membership should participate in ICANN’s business.
16 
Likewise, the former CEO and President of ICANN, M. Stuart Lynn, 
pursued radical reform of ICANN’s structure in an attempt to recap-
ture ICANN’s legitimacy.
17  
ICANN has offered a wide range of ways in which members of 
the Internet user community may participate in the organization’s de-
cision-making process,
18 but the extent to which ICANN paid atten-
tion to that user participation is much less clear. Throughout ICANN’s 
history, users have had the ability to post public commentary about 
general or specific issues before the ICANN board.
19 Users may at-
tend or participate remotely in public meetings at which the  board, 
                                                                                                    
12. ICANN, Fact Sheet, at http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.html (last visited Feb. 
15, 2004). 
13. Id. 
14. To a substantial extent, ICANN can be seen as an outgrowth of several volunteer-
driven standards bodies. Professor Michael Froomkin and others have extensively examined 
the connections between ICANN and other pre-existing organizations with Internet stan-
dards development or management mandates. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
15.  ICANN, About ICANN’s A t Large Membership Program,  at 
http://members.icann.org/about_at_large.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
16. See NGO & ACADEMIC ICANN STUDY, ICANN, LEGITIMACY, AND THE PUBLIC 
VOICE: MAKING GLOBAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION WORK  (Aug. 31, 2001), at 
http://www.naisproject.org/report/final/execsummaryUSLetter.pdf;  At-LARGE  STUDY 
COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT ON ICANN  AT  LARGE MEMBERSHIP (Nov. 5, 2001),  at 
http://www.atlargestudy.org/final_report.shtml. The NGO and Academic ICANN Study is 
made up of the collective views of a wide range of parties outside the ICANN structure. The 
At-Large Study Committee, a broad-based group of persons active in the ICANN process, 
prepared a report to the ICANN board. Both studies reviewed the election process and the 
future of the At-Large Membership and recommended revised structures for ICANN, 
though both would have perpetuated some form of a semidemocratic structure. For a com-
parison of the two studies, see John Palfrey, Comparisons of At Large Study Committee 
(ALSC) and NGO and Academic ICANN Study (NAIS) R eports (Sept. 2001),  at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/palfrey/ALSC-NAIS-comparison. 
17. Press Release, ICANN, ICANN President Recommends a Roadmap for Reform (Feb. 
24, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-24feb02.htm. 
18. See,  e.g., ICANN, Participate in ICANN, at http://www.icann.org/participate (last 
modified Dec. 5, 2003). In addition to formal involvement in ICANN's decision-making 
process, those interested in the outcome of its decisions have created a variety of watchdog 
organizations, such as ICANNWatch  (www.icannwatch.org), ICANNFocus 
(www.icannfocus.org), and others. 
19. See ICANN Public Comment Forum, at http://forum.icann.org (last visited Feb. 15, 
2004). 414   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
staff, and other entities make decisions.
20 Also, users may volunteer 
for a variety of tasks, most notably through participation in the Sup-
porting Organizations and Advisory Committees. Recently, the At-
Large A dvisory Committee has played a central role in facilitating 
involvement of the user community.
21  
While thousands of users since ICANN’s founding have sought to 
participate through these means, it a ppears as though this extensive 
participation has a ffected few important decisions.
22 The reason for 
this is that the structure ICANN adopted to fulfill its charter is so 
complex and obscure that too few people have been able to figure out 
how to contribute meaningfully.
23 It is so complex, in fact, that there 
are few useful analogs.
24 From a legal perspective, ICANN is a corpo-
ration, governed by its own charter and by-laws, and the laws of the 
State of California.
25 From an historical perspective, ICANN has at-
tributes in common with a standards body: a volunteer-driven effort 
that joins corporate interests, academics, and interested people in their 
individual capacities from around the world.
26 From a functional per-
spective, though, ICANN has elements of a  government e ntity: an 
association of people joined by a compact to make decisions about a 
particular process or series of interests.
27 The Election of 2000 
strengthens the parallel between ICANN and a governmental form, 
particularly what political scientists call a “semidemocracy.”  
                                                                                                    
20. See ICANN Meeting Schedule, at http://www.icann.org/meetings/ (last modified 
Dec. 5, 2003). 
21. See ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee, at http://alac.icann.org/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2004). 
22. See infra Section III.B. 
23. See Lawrence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: 
The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 141, 178 (2001) (describing the ICANN structure as “Byzantine”); see also ICANN, 
Organizational Chart, at http://www.icann.org/general/icann-org-chart.htm (last modified 
Jan. 12, 2004). 
24. But see, e.g., MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND 
THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 217–18 (2002) (arguing that while analogies are hard to draw, 
the best comparison is to the radio frequency administration at the national level). 
25. See ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 11; ICANN BYLAWS (last amended 
Oct. 13, 2003), available at http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm. 
26. Many of the key ICANN participants, including the board of directors, serve without 
pay. Longtime Chairman of the Board Vinton Cerf, among others, pays his own expenses to 
attend the quarterly meetings around the world. 
27. This issue, and others discussed in this paper, is debated at length in the back-and-
forth writings of Joe Sims, ICANN’s counsel and a partner at Jones Day, and his co-author 
Cynthia L. Bauerly, on the one hand, and Professor A. Michael Froomkin on the other. See 
generally A. Michael Froomkin,  Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route 
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000); Joe Sims & Cynthia L. 
Bauerly, A Response to Professor Froomkin: Why ICANN Does Not Violate the APA or the 
Constitution, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 65 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, Form and 
Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93 (2002); Joe Sims & Cynthia 
L. Bauerly, A Reply to Professor Froomkin’s Form and Substance in Cyberspace, 6 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 125 (2002); Weinberg, supra note 4; see also MUELLER, supra 
note 24, at 218.  No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  415 
 
ICANN has elements of all three structural forms, but no single 
element  dominates.  This hybrid organizational form is a historical 
accident rather than the result of clear, principled planning from the 
outset. Would-be participants, and even academics with a lot of time 
on their hands, must work hard to understand the decision-making 
process. This complexity is a problem in itself, because it serves as a 
stumbling block to ICANN’s goal of broad public partic ipation. If 
ICANN genuinely seeks to gain legitimacy of authority through open-
ness, the public must know how to participate so they can be heard. 
In addition to the relatively ad hoc means of user participation, 
ICANN held an online global election in the fall of 2000.
28 This elec-
tion was the most ambitious of its several attempts to engage the 
world’s Internet users in a common, open, democratic process.
29 De-
spite severely limited resources, ICANN’s election enfranchised vot-
ers from every region of the world. More than 76,000 people 
registered to vote at the Internet polling booths set up by Election.com 
to elect five ICANN directors.
30  
The relative tactical success of this election is overshadowed by 
the overall failure of ICANN’s experiment in at-large representation 
and participation. The story of formal representation through public 
elections of ICANN’s board effectively drew to a close on December 
15, 2002, as the elected directors’ terms ended, and the by-laws 
changed to end the experiment.
31 The shortcomings of this single ex-
periment, which can be traced in large measure to a lack of wide-
spread interest in the institution’s highly technical mandate and a 
futile attempt to establish an unsustainable semidemocracy, should not 
stand for the proposition that Internet-based elections, activist move-
ments, or global democratic institutions, cannot or will not emerge.
32 
However, it does suggest that ICANN is not the organization to prove 
this point. 
The outlook for ICANN’s experiment in broad-based, global rep-
resentation is very dim.
33 ICANN’s leadership maintains that it is “en-
                                                                                                    
28. See Press Release, ICANN, ICANN Selects Election.com to Conduct One of World’s 
Largest All-Internet Votes (Sept. 21, 2000), at http://www.icann.org/announcements/icann- 
pr21sep00.htm. 
29. See Oscar S. Cisneros, ICANN Elections Under Way, WIRED.COM (Oct. 2, 2000), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,39130,00.html. 
30. See Press Release, At-Large Member Committee, Carter Center Representatives Ob-
serve ICANN Balloting (Oct. 11, 2000), at http://members.icann.org/carter.htm. 
31. See ICANN BYLAWS (effective Dec. 15, 2002), available at http://www.icann.org/ 
general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-15dec02.htm. The existing At-Large directors remain on the 
“transition board” until the next election under the reformed procedures. 
32. See Computer Prof’ls for Social Responsibility, Registration of Internet Domain 
Names, at http://www.cpsr.org/cpsr/nii/cyber-rights/web/current-domain.html (last updated 
Nov. 21, 2000) (referring to ICANN as a “semi-democracy”). 
33. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas @ discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of 
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 838–55 (2003). Professor Froomkin’s article is surely 
the most ambitious paper written about the decision-making structure of ICANN and one of 416   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
couraging other forms of at-large organizations to self-organize and 
create and encourage a body of individuals who could provide the 
user input and public interest input into the ICANN process.”
34 How-
ever, hope has been further lessened by the continued calls to review 
ICANN’s structure and mission from members of the U.S. Congress, 
such as Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) and Congressman Edward 
Markey (D-MA), and leaders in non-governmental organizations, 
such as Zoë Baird, President of the Markle Foundation.
35 It seems 
certain, however, that if ICANN is not changed radically, the tension 
between ICANN’s efforts to make itself representative and its com-
plex institutional structure — particularly its corporate form — will 
continue to create problems over time.
36  
This Article explores ICANN’s struggle with legitimacy of a u-
thority. ICANN’s experiment in legitimacy was actually two interre-
lated experiments: to use the Internet to create legitimacy through 
openness, and to create legitimacy through representation. The e x-
periment in openness failed because openness requires clarity, and 
ICANN’s hybrid organizational form has only obscured how deci-
sions are made. When the experiment in openness failed, ICANN 
tried to salvage its legitimacy through representation in the Election of 
2000. However, this too failed because it made ICANN into a semi-
democracy. To escape its current crisis of legitimacy, ICANN has to 
discard half measures and become either truly open and truly repre-
sentative, or abandon such distractions and focus on succeeding in its 
narrow technical mandate.  
This Article argues that ICANN should relinquish responsibility 
for the experiment, because its  highly technical mandate rendered 
                                                                                                    
the more comprehensive considerations of where ICANN fits in the discussion of govern-
ance on the Internet. Among numerous arguments, Professor Froomkin contends that the 
ICANN model, in light of Jurgen Habermas’s standard for discourse ethics, pales in com-
parison to the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) model. Professor Froomkin’s tour 
de force regarding standards-making in the Internet space and his use of Habermas’s dis-
course theory of law is an important contribution to the field of Internet governance. 
Habermas’s theory, and Froomkin’s application thereof, has certain attractive elements, 
particularly with regard to the communicative power of discourse in influencing administra-
tive decisions and the impact that power has on how organizations responsible for Internet 
standards-making should be organized. I disagree with Professor Froomkin with respect to 
some of his ultimate findings about the Internet and democracy, particularly in the manner 
in which he compares the IETF and ICANN models, yet I am indebted to him for the depth 
of his research, the seriousness of his inquiry, and the explicit links he draws to Habermas’s 
thinking. 
34. Posting of M. Stuart Lynn, President and CEO of ICANN, to India Chennai, at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/technology/transcripts/archive_icann_062002.htm 
(last visited June 20, 2003). 
35. See, e.g., Joanna Glasner, Senators Weigh ICANN’s Future, WIRED.COM (June 13, 
2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53159,00.html. 
36. See, e.g., Interview by Damien Cave with John Gilmore, ICANN Critic and Internet 
Pioneer (July 2, 2002), at  http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/07/02/gilmore/ 
index2.html (describing the problems besetting ICANN in light of its present corporate 
structure). No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  417 
 
ICANN, as an institution, ill-suited to serve as the test bed for a new, 
user-driven model of decision  making. As important as ICANN’s 
mandate is, there are numerous technical aspects of the Internet that 
concern users more directly and substantially than the coordination of 
the DNS, as Professor Jonathan Zittrain has argued.
37 The job of di-
recting users to websites in response to the entry of search queries on 
the web — run almost exclusively by private parties such as Google, 
AltaVista, Overture, Microsoft, and others — has greater immediate 
relevance today to users than the port allocation managed by ICANN. 
Similarly, the exercise of authority by state actors and those they 
regulate, such as Internet Service Providers, to filter aspects of Inter-
net traffic without warning ex ante or recourse ex post has far greater 
impact on what a user of the Internet experiences and what resources 
he or she can access through the network.
38 An institution that would 
be able to succeed in the experiment by enabling the user community 
meaningfully and directly to be involved in the decision-making proc-
ess would likely have a mandate of greater accessibility and signifi-
cance to the Internet user community than ICANN’s narrow mandate 
to coordinate the DNS.  
We have yet to develop a compelling theory of governance for the 
technical architecture of the Internet.
39 We ought to consider 
ICANN’s story in this broader context of Internet governance, consid-
ering the role not only of individuals but also of corporations and 
governments in the process of decision making regarding these issues 
of global and common importance.
40  
I begin ICANN’s story in Section II by briefly reviewing the his-
tory of ICANN to illustrate how its founding principles and organiza-
tional structure conflict to drain legitimacy of authority from ICANN. 
                                                                                                    
37. See Jonathan Zittrain, Address at the Cardozo Law School (Mar. 17, 2003), available 
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/jzcardozo.html. 
38. Professor Jonathan Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman have conducted multiple studies 
of Internet filtering by state actors and private sector entities. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN & 
BENJAMIN  EDELMAN,  DOCUMENTATION OF  INTERNET  FILTERING  WORLDWIDE,  at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/ (last updated Oct. 24, 2003). 
39. There are several very strong theories about who controls the Internet, though not a 
complete answer to the question about how we should govern the Internet’s technical archi-
tecture. The definitive theory of control on the Internet is Professor Lawrence Lessig’s 
description of architecture (or code), law, norms, and market in cyberspace. Professor Les-
sig has developed this theory in a number of written works and has presented iterations of 
this idea numerous times. See,  e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG,  CODE AND OTHER  LAWS O F 
CYBERSPACE (1999); see also Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Shape of Governance: 
Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 605 (2003) (describing a 
“blended” model of governance); Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet? Moni-
toring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 454 (1998) (giving one 
of the earliest, and most enduring, discussions of Internet governance). See generally ADAM 
THIERER  &  CLYDE  WAYNE  CREWS,  JR., EDS.,  WHO  RULES THE  NET?  INTERNET 
GOVERNANC E AND JURISDICTION (2003). 
40. See Zittrain, supra note 37 (making the point that ICANN’s story ought to be set in 
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In Section III, I argue that a fundamental confusion about the meaning 
of “openness,” combined with ICANN’s convoluted decision-making 
structure, caused the experiment in openness to fail, because  users 
could not reasonably believe that the board listened to their concerns. 
Section IV argues that, in response to criticism generated by the fail-
ure of the experiment in openness, ICANN tried to achieve legitimacy 
through representation.  However, t his too failed because  it  made 
ICANN  into a  legitimacy-draining semidemocracy. In conclusion, I 
point to some of the implications of this short history for ICANN it-
self and for the study of how best to govern the technical architecture 
of the Internet. 
II. ICANN’S HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND IMPORTANCE 
The history of ICANN, and  the principles on which it was 
founded, help explain the structure of the institution, the struggle over 
the issue of representation, and how its problem of legitimacy came to 
be.
41 The first principles on which ICANN was founded are the seeds 
of its fundamental problem: if its legitimacy was truly meant to come 
from the Internet user community through its founding principles of 
openness and representation, its history and structure set it up to fail 
on its own terms. 
A. History and Principles 
The story of ICANN’s formation has been told, at least in part, by 
several scholars.
42 The most critical part of this story is that 
the founders — a mix of academics, government officials, corporate 
executives, and technologists — agreed upon a set of principles that 
have proven to be mutually exclusive. Most difficult to reconcile is 
that the founders wanted a private sector corporation to operate in a 
manner that is “representative” of global interests and “open” in its 
management decision making.
43 In striving for consensus, the foun-
                                                                                                    
41. See generally Weinberg, supra note 4.  
42. The most thorough history of ICANN is probably MUELLER, supra note 24. For some 
others worth noting, see also Weinberg, supra note 4; Ctr. for Democracy and Tech., Do-
main Name Management Policy: ICANN Formation,  at  http://www.cdt.org/ 
dns/icann/formation.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); ICANN, History of ICANN At 
Large, at http://members.icann.org/history.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); Robert Zakon, 
Hobbes’ Internet Timeline V.7.0,  at http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2004). 
43. See, e.g., Domain Name System Privatization: Is ICANN Out of Control? Hearing be-
fore the House Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the U.S. House Comm. on 
Commerce, 106th Cong. 134–274 (1999) (statement of Jonathan Zittrain, Executive Direc-
tor, The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School), available at 
http://com-notes.house.gov/cchear/hearings106.nsf/768df0faa6d9ddab852564f1004886c0/ 
53d384d363224ef2852567b7005119bc?OpenDocument; see also Post, supra note 2 (re-No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  419 
 
ders may have set themselves up for failure by embarking on a mis-
sion that is impossible to achieve completely.
44  
To a certain extent, despite Professor Mueller’s thorough history 
and related efforts, the development of ICANN’s structure has  re-
mained shrouded in secrecy.
45 The means by which many of the initial 
board members and officers were chosen is particularly unclear. Prior 
to ICANN, the technical coordination of key aspects of the Internet’s 
infrastructure was handled on an essentially ad hoc basis by a number 
of individuals in loose-knit, consensus-driven standards bodies 
such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”).
46 ICANN’s 
immediate predecessor, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(“IANA”), consisted essentially of Dr. Jon Postel of the University of 
Southern California and a very limited administrative staff.
47 How-
ever, a fter decades of management of the  DNS, and  as increasing 
numbers of people wanted access to the system and to the levers of 
control, the job became too large for these organizations.
48 Disputes 
began to arise between these loose-knit organizations, the U .S. gov-
ernment,
49 and private corporations such as Network Solutions, Inc., 
which had contracted to control the lucrative  “.com” top-level d o-
main.
50 
The reliance on a single nation’s grant of authority lies near the 
core of ICANN’s legitimacy problems. Despite its global mandate, 
                                                                                                    
garding discussions of the goals of ICANN and their relevance to the governance of the 
institution). 
44. Many political thinkers, from Locke to Jefferson, have talked about the problem of 
scale in the context of organizational form. On a smaller scale, a form of organization allow-
ing for a great deal of input is plausible. On a larger scale, living up to principles of repre-
sentation and openness — as the representatives grow  further away from those they 
represent — may be impossible to achieve. The global nature of ICANN sets the bar par-
ticularly high in this regard. 
45. See Jonathan Zittrain, Book Review, What’s in a Name?, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 153, 
158 (2003). 
46. See Froomkin, supra note 33, 782–815. Professors Froomkin, Mueller, and others 
have done admirable jobs of retelling the story of the IETF and its transition into the 
ICANN era.  
47.  See IANA Public Comments and Archives,  at  http://www.iana.org/comments/ 
comments.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2002). 
48. In general, business law scholars suggest that larger groups of people with divergent 
interests and access to information require the delegation of authority to a few leaders, while 
smaller groups with better aligned interests and access to information tend to work better by 
consensus. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 192–94 
(2002). I revisit this notion that organizations must decide between a “consensus” approach 
and an “authority” approach to self-governance in Section II.B.2.  
49. The U.S. government’s involvement was primarily through the National Science 
Foundation (“NSF”) during the IANA period, and the Department of Commerce thereafter. 
It is an interesting question as to how the NSF or the Department of Commerce derived their 
initial authority over the domain name system. For one analysis of this topic, see Joseph P. 
Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain Name Case Study, 74 
IND. L.J. 587, 593 (1999). 
50. VeriSign, Inc., purchased Network Solutions, Inc. in 2000, but subsequently sold off 
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ICANN retains extremely close ties to only one  nation, the United 
States.
51 ICANN emerged from a U .S. government initiative, in con-
cert with members of the private sector and the technical Internet 
community, intending to resolve the brewing dispute over governance 
of the  DNS.
52 The United States briefly considered taking over the 
DNS, but instead produced two preliminary documents in 1998, 
known as the “Green Paper”
53 and the “White Paper.”
54 These papers 
set forth a series of policy prescriptions and principles to govern how 
the  DNS would be managed. At the most fundamental level, the 
Green and White Papers established that the U .S. government would 
not actively manage the domain name system, but would rather em-
power the private sector to lead.
55 
In the wake of these policy pronouncements, representatives of 
IANA negotiated an agreement with the U .S. Department of Com-
merce in November 1998.
56 Based upon this agreement, ICANN came 
into being through the formation of a not-for-profit corporate entity in 
California. Its charter and by-laws incorporated a series of principles 
that reflected the desires of the founders as well as those of the Clin-
ton Administration.
57  
Once formally established as a California corporation, ICANN’s 
initial  board and officers are believed to have been hand-picked 
largely by the late Dr. Postel (who died abruptly in October 1998) 
through his authority at IANA.
58 In theory, the board membership was 
chosen to be representative of a cross-section of geographic areas ef-
                                                                                                    
51. Perhaps the most important documentation of this tie is the first Memorandum of Un-
derstanding. See Memorandum of Understanding Between ICANN and the United States 
Department of Commerce [hereinafter M oU 1998] (Nov. 25, 1999),  available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann.htm. 
52. See id.  
53.  NAT’L  TELECOMM.  &  INF O.  ADMIN.,  A  PROPOSAL T O  IMPROVE  TECHNICAL 
MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES (Jan. 30, 1998) [hereinafter GREEN 
PAPER], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm. 
54.  NAT’L TELECOMM.  &  INFO. ADMIN.,  MANAGEMENT OF  INTERNET  NAMES AND 
ADDRESSES (June 5, 1998) [hereinafter  WHITE  PAPER],  available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm. 
55. See MUELLER, supra note 24, at 1–10. 
56. See generally MoU 1998, supra note 51.  
57. The U.S. government’s role in managing the DNS, which continues to this day, could 
profitably serve as the subject of its own inquiry. Non-U.S. critics have repeatedly brought 
up the involvement of the Department of Commerce in aspects of ICANN management, 
particularly in terms of involvement in the contracting process between ICANN and Net-
work Solutions. A good archive of materials regarding the U.S. government’s policies on 
Internet-related issues can be found at http://www.ecommerce.gov. ICANN has periodically 
gone through a contract extension process with the U.S. Department of Commerce, most 
recently extending the MoU through 2006. See, e.g., Statement Regarding MoU, supra note 
5. 
58. See ICANN’t Believe What They’re Doing, NAT’L J.’S TECH. DAILY (June 17, 1999), 
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pil-99/icannt.txt; see also Milton Mueller, ICANN and Inter-
net Governance: Sorting Through the Debris of “Self-Regulation,” 1 INFO. 497, 498 (Dec. 
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fected by the DNS.
59 The initial board was made up of a number of 
highly respected members of the Internet community, including 
chairwoman Esther Dyson, an experienced U .S.-based e ntrepreneur, 
journalist, and a long-time leader in the technology world.
60 The for-
mal role and governing principles of ICANN, as well as an explana-
tion of the source of ICANN’s authority, are set forth clearly in the 
MoU between the U .S. Department of Commerce and ICANN.
61 The 
MoU delineates a role for ICANN that is largely confined to manag-
ing technical DNS functions, the numbering of Internet addresses, the 
coordination of port assignments, and assisting in the maintenance of 
the stability of the Internet.
62 ICANN was established to work with 
the U .S. Department of Commerce to ensure that the “private sector 
has the capability and resources to assume the important responsibili-
ties related to the technical management of the DNS.”
63 The project 
listed the following among its goals: encouraging international par-
ticipation,
64 providing expertise and advice on the allocation of IP 
number blocks and coordinating the a ssignment of other Internet 
technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity of 
the Internet,
65 collaborating on written technical parameters for opera-
tion of the authoritative root,
66 and collaborating on a study and proc-
                                                                                                    
59. This characterization of ICANN’s development process almost dangerously oversim-
plifies the story. However, there is a dearth of reliable information about the process; the 
record is replete with conspiracy theories, but short on official statements or reasonably 
objective historical inquiries. 
60. See ICANN, Esther Dyson, at http://www.icann.org/biog/dyson.htm (last visited Jan. 
24, 2002). 
61. MoU 1998, supra note 51.  
62. The specific role set forth for ICANN, as compared with the work that the IETF seeks 
to accomplish, is a key reason for my disagreement with Professor Froomkin’s assessment 
of standards-making bodies. See Froomkin, supra note 33. There is a substantial difference 
between what the IETF does in setting standards and what IANA and ICANN have sought 
to do in managing the DNS and related technical tasks. These disparate functions call for 
different modes of organization, structure, and discourse. This distinction is set forth nicely 
in a paper by Joseph Liu. Professor Liu, on the distinction between the proper mode for 
technical standards-setting and management of the DNS, wrote that proposals to extend 
IETF-style decision making processes to ICANN fail to: 
[A]ppreciate the fact that domain name problems are not purely, or 
even primarily, technical in nature. Rather, they are classic public 
policy questions, requiring the resolution of conflicting distributional 
and value chains. The public policy aspect of the domain name prob-
lem undercuts many of the assumptions that underlie the standard-
setting model of coordination. The result is that attempts to use the 
current standard-setting process face serious legitimacy and imple-
mentation problems.  
Liu, supra note 49, at 589. 
63. MoU 1998, supra note 51, arts. II.A–II.B. 
64. See id. art. II.A. 
65. See id. art. V.C.1. 
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ess to address operational requirements of the root name servers and 
the security of the root server system.
67  
Most important for this inquiry, the MoU specifically set a goal 
for ICANN of achieving “representation” through process, as set forth 
in the following clause: 
4. Representation. This Agreement promotes the 
technical management of the DNS in a manner that 
reflects the global and functional diversity of Internet 
users and their needs. This Agreement is intended to 
promote the design, development, and testing of 
mechanisms to solicit public input, both domestic 
and international, into a private-sector decision mak-
ing process. These mechanisms will promote the 
flexibility needed to adapt to changes in the compo-
sition of the Internet user community and their 
needs.
68 
Those who initially conceived ICANN acknowledged the global 
nature of the network, the global implications of the technical man-
agement that they were undertaking, and the need to take into account 
the needs and composition of the Internet user community. In so do-
ing, the founders of ICANN committed themselves to managing the 
organization in such a way as to achieve representation of a constitu-
ency arguably unparalleled in its breadth.
69 The ICANN founders also 
established ICANN with a view toward testing new mechanisms for 
involving the public in a private-sector decision-making process. 
ICANN s ubsequently chartered a study on representation by the 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and 
frequently requested comment by others on the topic of representa-
tion.
70 The statement by the U .S. Department of Commerce on Sep-
                                                                                                    
67. See id. art. V.C.5(a). Many of these same principles can be found in the Green and 
White Papers. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 53; WHITE PAPER, supra note 54. 
68. MoU 1998, supra note 51, art. II.C.4. 
69. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 235–50 (arguing that it is extremely difficult to deter-
mine whether ICANN’s process is truly “representative” of a global community of users). 
70. BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTER NET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD LAW SCH., REPRESENTATION 
IN CYBERSPACE STUDY, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs (last modified May 26, 1999); 
see,  e.g.,  ICANN Public Meeting Transcript ( Nov. 14, 1998),  at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/cambridge-1198/Archive/transmembership.html.  Later, 
ICANN moved away from public involvement. See ICANN, Preliminary Report: ICANN 
Meeting in Accra (Mar. 14, 2002),  at  http://www.icann.org/minutes/ 
prelim-report-14mar02.htm (recounting statements of the ICANN leadership when abolish-
ing direct representation at the meeting in Accra, Ghana); Andrew Orlowski, ICANN Abol-
ishes Net Democracy,  But Esther Steps In,  THE  REGISTER (Mar. 15, 2002),  at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/24443.html (criticizing both ICANN’s decision to 
abolish direct representation and the subsequent gestures of former ICANN chair Ester 
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tember 16, 2003, regarding the extension of the MoU, reiterates the 
use of the word “representative” in multiple contexts.
71 
Despite — or perhaps because of — the articulation of this found-
ing principle, much of the critique of ICANN to date has revolved 
around the problem of representation.
72  Representation has proven 
problematic because of the extremely high expectations (set by the 
governing principles) that the organization’s leaders would represent 
such enormous and varied constituencies and the lack of precision 
about what “representation” means.
73 Critics of ICANN have been 
vocal,  expressing their views through  websites, bulletin boards, 
listservs, and the news media.
74 Certain participants have concluded 
that corporate interests have been granted too much authority in the 
process.
75 Similarly, some have argued that the process favors  U.S. 
interests too greatly.
76 Still others have accused the initial board of 
moving too slowly to become a more formally representative body.
77 
Few have argued that representation should not be a governing princi-
ple of the organization. My argument is, in essence, that if ICANN 
commits to holding itself out as representative of the Internet user 
community, ICANN should both clarify and make good on its com-
mitment. 
In addition to seeking to represent the global community of Inter-
net users, the founders of ICANN committed to an “open” manner of 
managing the DNS and making decisions. Like the variety of possible 
meanings of “representation,” a clash of several understandings of the 
meaning o f “open” has also contributed to the hybrid nature of the 
ICANN structure. The notion of openness is often cited in the early 
writings about what makes cyberspace distinctive. Openness as a con-
cept — as in “open source,” “open access,” or even “open law” — has 
taken on a nearly mythic status in cyberlaw writings. Longtime col-
laborators Professor Lawrence Lessig of Stanford Law School and 
                                                                                                    
71. Statement Regarding MoU, supra note 5; see also MoU 2002, supra note 5 (reiterat-
ing the commitment to “representation”).  
72. See David R. Johnson & Susan P. Crawford, Why Consensus Matters: The Theory 
Underlying ICANN’s Mandate to Set Policy Standards for the Domain Name System, 
ICANN  WATCH ( Aug. 23, 2000),  at  http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/ 
why_consensus_matters.htm; David R. Johnson & Susan P. Crawford, The Idea of ICANN, 
ICANN  WATCH  (Feb. 12, 2001),  at  http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/ 
the_idea_of_icann.htm. 
73. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 259–60. 
74. The websites hosting a vast and growing archive of information critical of ICANN 
include official ICANN sites, such as www.icann.org, as well as www.icannwatch.org and 
www.slashdot.org. A simple search on Google (www.google.com), for instance, with the 
term “ICANN” yields many other sources of critical information. See also ICANN Blog 
Aggregator, at http://aggregator.does-not-exist.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
75.  See Gordon Cook,  At War for the Future of the Internet,  at 
http://cookreport.com/icannregulate.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
76. See Jennifer Rast, The U.N. Plan to Take Over the Internet, CONTENDER MINISTRIES 
(Jan. 10, 2004), at http://www.contenderministries.org/UN/wsis.php.  
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Professor Charles Nesson of Harvard Law School have written and 
spoken about the importance of the “open society” in cyberspace and 
the many threats to that ideal.
78 The open society is held out as one 
manifestation of the great promise of the Internet as a digital com-
mons in which empowerment of individuals, widespread sharing of 
ideas across cultural and other boundaries, a nd free expression are 
glorified.
79 The idea of openness, with its many various connotations, 
has tremendous resonance and multiple special meanings to the activ-
ists of the Internet community. 
Since the founding of ICANN, the officers and directors have 
continued to restate their commitment to representation and open-
ness.
80 At the very least, the managers have continued to employ the 
rhetoric of these founding principles.
81 One sentence from the organi-
zation’s public website bundles the principles t ogether:  “It is 
ICANN’s objective to operate as an open, transparent, and consensus-
based body that is broadly representative of the diverse stakeholder 
communities of the global Internet.”
82 The recent leadership of 
ICANN has underscored this commitment to representation. M. Stuart 
Lynn, upon appointment as president and chief executive, said, 
“ICANN takes its lead not from me but from the Internet community 
as a whole.”
83 Based on this guidance, Mr. Lynn issued a statement 
one year later that the experiment that is ICANN should take a dra-
                                                                                                    
78. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Reclaiming a Commons, Keynote Address at the Berk-
man Center’s  “Building a Digital Commons” (May 20,  1999),  available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/lessigkeynote.pdf; see also Open Society Institute, at 
www.soros.org/about (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
79. See generally LESSIG, supra note 39 (outlining the classic and most effective descrip-
tion of the promise, realities, and future of cyberspace, as told partway through the Internet 
explosion). See also Salbu, supra note 39. 
80. For instance, ICANN President Paul Twomey is quoted as saying that ICANN is pur-
suing “a more open process” for creating new top-level domains. Ctr. for Regulatory Effec-
tiveness, ICANN Pledges to Adopt Unspecified New Domain Name Selection Process, at 
http://thecre.com/icann/govern-oct2003-1.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2004); see also James 
Pearce, New ICANN Head Promises Greater Openness, ZDNET UK (Mar. 20, 2003), at 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/0,39020645,2132226,00.htm ( quoting  Twomey commit-
ting to an ICANN that is “very open and consultative with all the stakeholders.”); Jonathan 
Weinberg,  Geeks and Greeks 4 –5 (unpublished manuscript),  at 
http://www.law.wayne.edu/weinberg/geeksandgreeks.pdf ( July 30, 2001) (exploring  and 
contextualizing a series of statements regarding representation of the Internet user commu-
nity). 
81. The U.S. Department of Commerce has used slightly different language to make a 
similar point when it renewed the MoU. For instance, the Department noted that ICANN 
needed to strive “to ensure transparency and accountability in its processes and decision 
making” and “to increase its responsiveness to Internet stakeholders.” Statement Regarding 
MoU, supra note 5. Transparency, accountability, and responsiveness are akin to openness 
and representation, but convey a slightly different set of goals.  
82. iRegistrars.com, ICANN, at http://www.iregistrars.com/icann.html (last visited Feb. 
23. 2004).  
83. Robyn Weisman, New ICANN CEO Pledges Independence, NEWSFACTOR (Jan. 25, 
2001), at http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/7000.html. No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  425 
 
matically different turn. The board found that “a purely private o r-
ganization will not work.”
84 
Scaling has proven hard for ICANN.
85 As the scope of responsi-
bility and number of constituents grows, so too does the difficulty of 
managing in a representative, open, and consensus-driven manner.
86 
Representation becomes more difficult as individuals grow further 
away from those who represent them, whether geographically or as a 
matter of sheer ratio. Whereas one representative used to have a con-
stituency of 100, now he or she has a constituency of hundreds of mil-
lions (in the case of North America), or even billions of people (in the 
case of Asia). Similarly, openness — particularly in the sense of trans-
parency — becomes harder with scale, as n ot all decisions can be 
made by a small group of directors and officers in front of the world 
at large.
87 
B. ICANN’s Hybrid Structure and Its Drain on Legitimacy 
ICANN’s complex hybrid structure is the root of its legitimacy 
problem. Rather than being chosen as the structure most able to man-
age the DNS, or to achieve the principles of openness and representa-
tion, ICANN’s structure was a compromise in the worst sense of the 
                                                                                                    
84. ICANN President Recommends a Roadmap for Reform, supra note 17. 
85. See Posting of Kent Crispin, kent@songbird.com, to  wg-c@dnso.org (Mar. 12, 
2000), at http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-c/Arc01/msg00909.html (discussing one of the 
particular types of scaling problems facing ICANN with respect to the introduction of new 
general Top Level Domains (“gLTDs”)). 
86. If the user community is defined either as the absolute number of Internet users glob-
ally or as the number of domain names registered, ICANN’s number of constituents has 
grown markedly throughout its history. Likewise, as ICANN has introduced new gTLDs 
and has added the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) process to 
its workload, its substantive responsibilities have grown. See Uniform Domain-Name Dis-
pute-Resolution Process,  at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last updated Aug. 26, 
2001). 
87. ICANN has taken the laudable step of webcasting virtually all major sessions of its 
quarterly meetings to make its proceedings accessible to all who are interested. Webcasting, 
while an extraordinary technological advance for providing open meetings, nonetheless has 
its limitations. While access to a webcast is limited potentially by both bandwidth (particu-
larly on the receiving side) and licenses to reach a certain number of end users (in the case 
of RealNetworks webcast production software), no ICANN webcast has yet hit server ca-
pacity. However, even the most aggressive and costly webcast can only offer a more or less 
passive experience to those who watch live streaming audio and video. If openness is simply 
to be able to watch and listen, then the webcast is surely sufficient for those with access to a 
relatively modern  computer and a moderately fast Internet connection.  Yet,  if openness 
requires  an ability to participate beyond submitting real-time text-based comments, then 
webcasting may come up somewhat short. Nonetheless, webcasting is a critically important 
element of ICANN’s effort to make its proceedings accessible to a global audience. Over 
the past few years, however, ICANN has withdrawn some of the tools for participation 
related to these webcasts, like the prompt posting of substantial meeting notes and the abil-
ity to submit real-time comments, which had, in the past, been read to the board and were 
posted as part of the meeting archives. 426   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
word.
88 The designers attempted to blend the best parts of a corpora-
tion, a standards b ody, and a government entity, but they ended up 
with a structure that does not carry the legitimacy of authority or ef-
fectiveness of any of its component parts.  
1. ICANN as a Standards Body 
At least some of the organizations that predate ICANN, such as 
the IETF, could be characterized as standards-setting organizations, 
with varying degrees of formality in their decision-making processes. 
These loosely structured, volunteer-powered organizations tradition-
ally created legitimacy of authority by using consensus to make deci-
sions. The IETF, for instance, took no votes and had no formal 
leaders, but rather sought “rough consensus,” making its decisions by 
listening to the “hums” of those persons present.
89 Many of those ac-
tive in ICANN today, particularly in the more technical capacities, 
come from the IETF tradition.  
Vestiges of the standards body structure remain in ICANN. The 
powerful Supporting Organizations — which send members to the 
board of directors, and are responsible for providing guidance to the 
board on issues under the Supporting Organizations’ jurisdiction —
are staffed almost entirely by volunteers. Often, they must pay their 
own travel expenses to attend ICANN’s far-flung quarterly meet-
ings.
90 These Supporting Organizations have also been the venue for 
most bottom-up decision-making aspects of ICANN’s structure. 
ICANN, however, does not operate in the same manner as most 
standards bodies, such as the World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”), 
the IANA, or the IETF.
91 ICANN, despite its rhetoric about bottom-up 
organization, has a board of directors that exercises ultimate authority 
over the administration of a technical governance system to which 
millions around the globe implicitly agree. As more individuals, cor-
porations, institutions, and governments develop an interest in the 
                                                                                                    
88. See Sims infra note 264 and accompanying text (describing ICANN’s structure as a 
compromise that does not do anything well).  
89. See William A. Foster, Registering the Domain Name System: An Exercise in Global 
Decision-Making,  at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/iip/cai/foster.html (last visited Dec. 3, 
2002); see also Jonathan Zittrain, V ideotape: Lecture on Domain Names, ICANN, and 
Internet Governance (The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School 
2001), at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/berkmancommons/icann.html. See generally IETF, 
Tao of the IETF: A Novices Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force, (Aug. 2001), at 
http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (discussing the principles, decision-making methods, and his-
tory of the IETF).  
90. An archive of ICANN’s meeting sites since its inception in 1998 can be found at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann. 
91. There are, of course, many similarities between ICANN, the W3C, and the IETF, 
such as the fact that Supporting Organization staff and members pay their own travel ex-
penses. The clear distinction lies primarily in the realm of how final decisions are made and 
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DNS, and as the Internet becomes more and more central to people’s 
lives, the  informal standards-body model becomes  less adequate. 
ICANN’s increasingly formal and professional structure, including its 
CEO, staff, and board of directors, coupled with the attempted intro-
duction of global elections, suggests a further move away from the 
model of its predecessors and their basis of legitimacy through con-
sensus. 
2. ICANN as a Corporation 
Literally, ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation established in the 
State of California on September 30, 1998.
92 Its governance structure 
vests virtually all power in the board of directors, who may delegate 
authority to a series of full time, professional officers, many of whom 
have had impressive careers before joining the ICANN staff.
93 As a 
not-for-profit corporation, there are no shareholders per se, but the At-
Large Membership sought unsuccessfully to  approximate that role 
during the two years it had voting power.
94 
Whether or not for-profit, the California corporate model seems 
particularly inadequate to create legitimacy for a global organization 
purporting to represent a worldwide populace and multiple cross-
border constituencies. The corporate structure works well for organi-
zations pursuing profit or engaged in advocacy, but it makes no sense 
given ICANN’s specific public mission. Also, other than in the divi-
sion of roles between officers and directors, and the limitation of li-
ability, ICANN does not function like a traditional corporation.
95  
The corporate form’s reliance upon the laws of a single U.S. state 
is a substantial  liability to ICANN’s legitimacy of authority. The in-
terconnecting relationships between ICANN, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, VeriSign (a California for-profit corporation), and other 
                                                                                                    
92. For b asic structural information regarding ICANN, see ICANN Corporate Docu-
ments,  at  http://www.icann.org/general/corporate.html  (last visited Feb.  20, 2004); 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 11. 
93. See ICANN BYLAWS, supra note 25. 
94. Not-for-profits can have “members,” which are roughly equivalent to for-profit share-
holders. ICANN, under pressure from the U.S. Department of Commerce, included in its 
original bylaws a reservation for a membership. ICANN BYLAWS art. II (Nov. 6, 1998), 
available at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-06nov98.htm. 
95. Academic theories of the firm come up short when applied to the ICANN corporate 
form. The Coase-style “Theory of the Firm’s” focus on transaction costs appears almost 
entirely irrelevant. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (ns) 386 
(1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). While perhaps 
marginally more apt, it is likewise hard to justify ICANN’s corporate form along the lines of 
the “Nexus of Contracts” or “Web of Contracts” theories, especially given that the majority 
of stakeholders have made no contract with the ICANN corporate entity or with each other. 
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE LAW 
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corporate sponsors, already raise questions about the U.S. focus of 
this global entity. The corporate form holds ICANN back from e x-
panding beyond its West Coast roots toward true representation of the 
global community. The ICANN headquarters in Marina del Ray natu-
rally attracts staff from the U nited States who are interested in living 
in California. Every member of the board and staff has traditionally 
spoken English — the predominant language of both the Internet and 
the State of California. ICANN’s efforts to broaden the geographic 
and cultural diversity of its At-Large Membership and board of direc-
tors are laudable, but any gains will be limited by ICANN’s formal 
corporate structure.
96 
The study of business law suggests another critique of ICANN: 
its structure and grounding principles may be incompatible over the 
long term. Business law commentators, including Professor Stephen 
Bainbridge of UCLA, have shown that organizations choose one of 
two models for their internal governance:  “consensus”  or  “author-
ity.”
97 The consensus model is most effectively employed when each 
member of the organization has the same information and members’ 
interests are aligned.
98 The consensus model can only work well in the 
absence of a  substantial collective action problem. The authority 
model, by contrast, vests decision-making power in a central agency 
(in the corporate context, the  board of  directors), which grounds its 
decisions on input from other stakeholders.
99 The authority structure 
works best when stakeholders have varying amounts of organization 
and misaligned interests. The corporate form in the United States pro-
vides, by statute, for an authority-style organization.
100  
ICANN, as a corporation, has the core structure of an authority-
style organization. The power to decide is, after consultation, vested 
in the hands of a few. If Professor Bainbridge and his colleagues are 
correct, this authority structure fits ICANN. The many stakeholders in 
ICANN — ranging from the individual Internet user, to large corpora-
tions, to not-for-profit civil liberties organizations, to the European 
Union — have wildly varying levels of information and interests.
101 
Even if these disparities were not there, the Internet community is 
especially vulnerable to collective action problems. If ICANN  were 
                                                                                                    
96. It may be that any global organization would be forced to struggle with the problem 
of geographic location of operations. However, ICANN’s structure as a California-based 
corporation exacerbates, rather than mitigates, this problem. 
97. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 48, at 192–94.  
98. See id. 
99. See id.  
100. See id.; see, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141 (2004). 
101. ICANN’s hybrid structure also involves a complex series of forums for various in-
dividuals to advocate for their interests. It is quite relevant that the power afforded these 
forums is not equally distributed. For instance, consumers have no official voting represen-
tative, whereas trademark owners have their own representative on the Domain Names 
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only to care about managing the DNS well, these factors suggest that 
an authority structure might be appropriate and necessary for ICANN 
to succeed. However, the problem arises with the superimposition of 
the corporate form on ICANN’s legacy of seeking consensus and its 
grounding principle of representation.  
ICANN’s corporate structure is not well-aligned with aspects of 
its history and its stated goals. Its commitment to openness and repre-
sentation clashes with its corporate form to drain much of ICANN’s 
dwindling legitimacy of authority. The theories of business law, ap-
plied to the context of ICANN, suggest that if ICANN must remain a 
corporation, even in form only, then it may be doomed to fail on its 
own terms. 
3. ICANN as a Government Entity 
ICANN also embodies elements of a government entity. As with 
other analogs, the parallel is not exact: ICANN lacks many of the tra-
ditional hallmarks of a government entity, such as enforcement pow-
ers. However, ICANN’s quasi-governance role, coupled with its 
stated goal of representation, the Election of 2000, and its usage of 
multiple attributes of the administrative agency model, renders the 
analogy to a government entity informative.
102 
The story of ICANN’s formation resembles the formation of a 
state. In the political theory of thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rous-
seau, people are born into a state of nature. While they are free in that 
they have no sovereign, they enslave themselves through the anarchy 
that ensues.
103 In the Internet context, the first several years of mass 
Internet usage were characterized by a call to arms to keep the space 
free of sovereigns, much like a state of nature. Former Grateful Dead 
songwriter John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace,” written in Davos, Switzerland, in 1996, is the classic 
example of such a call to arms.  “Governments of the Industrial 
World . . .  are not welcome among us,” Barlow wrote of  cyber-
space.
104 “I declare the global social space we are building to be natu-
rally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us.”
105 The 
seams of the state of nature begin to show, however, as the space be-
                                                                                                    
102. As noted above, Mueller prefers this analogy of ICANN as a government. See 
MUELLER supra note 24; see also Weinberg, supra note 4, at 187. 
103. As Rousseau wrote, “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” JEAN J. 
ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in  ROUSSEAU’S POLITICAL WRITINGS  85 (Alan Ritter & 
Julia Conway Bondanella eds., Julian Conway Bondanella trans., Norton Critical ed. 1998) 
(1762). 
104. JOHN P. BARLOW, A DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE (Feb. 
28, 1996), at http://www.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.  
105. Id. But see LESSIG, supra note 39; Neil W. Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A 
Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 397–99 (2000). 430   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
comes crowded and interests begin to diverge. Fights ensue, which in 
turn cannot be resolved amicably in the absence of a sovereign. In 
cyberspace,  a number of fights have begun: disputes over technical 
governance of the Internet, use of certain domain names, and expan-
sion of general Top Level Domains (“gTLDs”) are among the earliest 
of those fights. To establish positive liberties, people enter into a so-
cial contract by vesting power in a sovereign to govern their collective 
lives. In the cyberspace story, some of those frustrated by the state of 
nature entered into a series of agreements culminating  in  ICANN, 
which was created to lend order to the growing chaos. 
This parallel, though inexact, has some merit, especially in light 
of ICANN’s experiment to acquire its legitimacy d irectly from the 
people of the Internet community. While cyberspace is not physical 
space and the global community of Internet users is not joining a na-
tion-state, certain Internet users have agreed to the ICANN system as 
a means of determining how to co-exist in some parts of cyberspace. 
Those who acknowledge ICANN’s authority, who buy into the prin-
ciples of openness and representation, are agreeing to the superimpo-
sition of a certain sovereignty and a series of rules to live by with 
respect to the DNS.
106 In particular, anyone who wishes to obtain and 
hold a domain name must agree to ICANN’s sovereignty. Rather than 
thinking of a governing entity as a state per se with enforcement pow-
ers, the basic notion of joining into a social contract and submitting to 
a sovereign holds in the cyberspace context.
107 
The shortcomings of the parallel to a government entity are i m-
mediately apparent.
108 ICANN is not, strictly speaking, a government 
entity.
109 It neither sought nor attained the consent of those it gov-
erned at the time of its formation or subsequently. As Professor 
Froomkin argues forcefully, ICANN sought to carry the legitimacy of 
the IETF forward but has failed to do so.
110 Also, its inability to en-
                                                                                                    
106. This notion squares with Rousseau’s philosophy of the emergence of the state:  
[T]he act of association includes a reciprocal commitment between 
the public and the private individuals composing it, and that each in-
dividual, contracting, so to speak, with himself, finds himself com-
mitted in two ways: namely, towards private individuals as a member 
of the sovereign, and toward the sovereign as a member of the state. 
ROUSSEAU, supra note 103, at 93–94. 
107. Another way of conceiving of ICANN as akin to a state is to note the extensive 
power of formal states through the Governmental Advisory Committee, all the more so 
because of the changes to the ICANN by-laws after the September 11th attacks on the 
United States. See Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, From Self-Governance to Public-Private Part-
nership: The Changing Role of Governments in the Management of the Internet’s Core 
Resources, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (2003). 
108. See generally Weinberg, supra note 4. 
109. ICANN grounds its authority in a sole source contract with the U.S. government. 
More than seventy-five governments participate through the General Advisory Committee. 
ICANN itself is not formally vested with the powers of a government entity, nor is it prop-
erly thought of as a treaty organization. 
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force its decisions is a major divergence from the government model. 
ICANN’s scope is so limited that there is little room to argue that 
ICANN governs people’s lives in the way that most governments do. 
Its organization stems from neither a series of substantive rights nor a 
theory of procedure.
111 Some critics of ICANN continue to cling to 
Barlow’s circa 1996 theory that the Internet cannot or should not be 
governed in any way,
112 and ICANN’s leaders have consistently 
claimed that ICANN does not govern, but rather coordinates a techni-
cal system.
113  
The ICANN Election of 2000 brings this issue of its parallel to a 
government entity into relief. Despite the incompleteness of the paral-
lel, ICANN’s increased efforts to achieve representation of the global 
community of Internet stakeholders suggested, though briefly, a move 
toward a democratic institution. Other forms of organization, such as 
the corporation, rely on fiduciary duties rather than the notion of di-
rect representation.
114 In the shareholder-manager scenario of a corpo-
ration, for instance, the board and officers have a fiduciary 
responsibility to the shareholders and have an obligation to increase 
shareholder value. However, the board and officers do not necessarily 
represent all or even a particular subset of those who contributed capi-
tal. The relationship is better described by agency rather than by rep-
resentation. The notion of a director specifically representing the 
interests of stakeholders and voicing their interests to the decision 
makers, as ICANN has effectively sought to do through the At-Large 
Membership and the elected directors, draws the parallel of ICANN’s 
structure away from the corporate model and closer to a government. 
                                                                                                    
111. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, How Can the People Ever Make the Laws? A Cri-
tique of Deliberative Democracy, in ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS: DELIBERATIVE 
DEMO CRACY 152 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997). 
112. But see LESSIG, supra note 39, at 24–29 (arguing against the idea that the Internet 
has a nature that is unregulable). 
113. For instance, ICANN Chairwoman Esther Dyson took issue with the use of the term 
“Internet governance” as being part of ICANN’s job description. In response to a question 
posed by Ralph Nader and James Love, Dyson wrote, “ICANN does not ‘aspire to address’ 
any Internet governance issues; in effect, it governs the plumbing, not the people.” Letter 
from Esther Dyson, Chairwoman, ICANN, to Ralph Nader and James Love (June 15, 1999), 
available  at  http://www.icann.org/correspondence/dyson-response-to-nader-15jun99.htm. 
But see Andrew McLaughlin, Remarks at Harvard Law School Internet & Society 1999 
class (Sept. 16, 1999), at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/is99/scribes2.html (transcription by 
Benjamin Edelman) (“‘ICANN does technical coordination, not Internet governance.’ 
That’s the party line. But the truth is that technical coordination is in some ways a lot like 
governance.”). For uses of the term “governance” in relation to ICANN in common par-
lance, see articles such as Internet Governance: Domain Strain, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 
2001, at 64. 
114. In the corporate setting, voting is an important attribute of most state-mandated sys-
tems, but shareholders — the “voters” — are not strictly speaking represented by particular 
directors. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF CORPORATE LAW 63–89 (1991); see also Lucian Bebchuk, A Framework for Analyzing 
Legal Policy Transactions Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1073 (1990). 432   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
ICANN is not purely a standards body, a corporation, or a gov-
ernment entity. It has elements of each, but none of these models suf-
fices on its own to describe ICANN’s current hybrid structure. This 
conclusion leaves open a vexing question, which has both positive and 
normative elements. What kind of institution is ICANN? What kind of 
institution should it be? Where does its legitimacy come from? The 
answers to  these questions are not clear. It is important, though, to 
recognize that ICANN strives to operate by clear founding principles 
in a highly complex structure — the complexity of which makes fidel-
ity to these principles all the more challenging. That complexity was 
also an opportunity to test the Internet’s ability to enable a new, more 
democratic and empowering — though ultimately unsuccessful —
form of decision making. 
C. Does ICANN Need Legitimacy: Does It Matter Whether ICANN 
Lives Up to Its Principles? 
ICANN has caught the imagination of certain technologists, 
scholars, lawyers, and businesspeople from various fields, but remains 
virtually unknown to the general public.
115 A vast majority of the 
roughly 600 million people who use the Internet to gather informa-
tion, communicate via e-mail, or shop online appear to have little in-
terest in the technical administration of the DNS.
116 If many people 
who use the Internet neither know, nor much care, about what ICANN 
does, does ICANN even need to legitimate its authority? Does it mat-
ter at all whether ICANN lives up to its founding principles? More-
over, does it matter what sort of governance structure ICANN has? 
One prevalent line of argument, that ICANN’s work is so arcane and 
remote from the lives of everyday people, suggests that the answer to 
these questions is “no.” However, in light of ICANN’s current role, 
                                                                                                    
115. The Markle Foundation commissioned a survey which cited the lack of knowledge 
about ICANN as a major concern.  See  JERRY  BERMAN ET AL.,  ICANN’S  GLOBAL 
ELECTIONS:  ON THE  INTERNET,  FOR THE  INTERNET, ii, iv  (Mar.  22, 2000),  at 
http://www.markle.org/news/icann_report.pdf. 
[N]early every member of the Internet community with whom we 
spoke, as well as respected outside observers, identified fundamental 
problems with the current plan for the election being put in place by 
ICANN. Some of these problems can be addressed through improve-
ments in the proposed election process, but others are the products of 
conflicting goals for the election itself. These problems are com-
pounded by the fact that most of the electorate envisioned by ICANN 
does not know what ICANN is or what it does. In short, what we 
found is a proposed election process for ICANN viewed with almost 
uniform skepticism by informed observers. 
Id. 
116.  See,  e.g.,  eTForecasts, Internet User Forecast by Country,  at 
http://www.etforecasts.com/products/ES_intusers.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (providing 
one analysis of world-wide Internet usage, ordinarily pegged between 500 million and 600 
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and its importance to the global economy and to the Internet, a net-
work of increasing importance to the lives of people in more than one 
hundred countries, the answer to these questions is “yes.”
117 ICANN’s 
structure and management are important because ICANN’s mission is 
important, and also because ICANN was thought to have presented an 
extraordinary opportunity to experiment with a new medium’s power 
of institution-building on a global scale. Furthermore, observers have 
posited that ICANN should serve as an experiment in strengthening 
participation in democratic institutions generally through innovative 
use of the Internet.
118 The outcome and lessons learned from 
ICANN’s experiment are significant because it is viewed by some as a 
test case for innovation in technology-powered democratic govern-
ance.  
ICANN is among the few organizations recognized formally, at 
least by the U .S. government, as empowered to administer certain 
critically important technical procedures that affect the entire Inter-
net.
119 Since the Internet is a network that joins hundreds of millions 
of people across the world, and as such has prompted many powerful 
interests to become involved in its activities, ICANN may well be 
“the most important Internet organization you’ve probably never 
heard of.”
120 Evidence of the importance of ICANN’s work is primar-
ily qualitative in nature, but ample in quantity.  Naturally,  govern-
ments have focused substantial attention on ICANN. On several 
occasions, members of the U .S. Congress have held hearings and i s-
sued public statements that, at least in part, question whether the De-
partment of Commerce-backed ICANN had garnered too much 
authority over a public resource without sufficient legitimacy.
121 Sev-
eral institutions of the European Union have focused on ICANN, re-
                                                                                                    
117. For a consideration of why ICANN does or does not matter, see Zittrain, supra note 
37.  
118. See, e.g., Steven Hill, ICANN: Secret Government of the Internet? The Fight Over 
Who Will Control the Web,  IN  THESE  TIMES ( May 15, 2000),  at 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/24/12/hill2412.html. 
119. Other important technical procedures that affect people's ability to access the Inter-
net are administered by the International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), which is 
formally recognized by 189 governments. See  Int’l Telecomm. Union, Overview,  at 
http://www.itu.int/members/index.html (last updated Mar. 10, 2004). 
120. Dan Gillmor,  ICANN Election Carries Hope of Needed Change,  
COMPUTERWORLD  (Oct. 30, 2000),  at http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/story/ 
0,1199,NAV47_STO53016,00.html. 
121. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Congress to Enter ICANN Fray, WIRED.COM (Mar. 
14, 2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51041,00.html. It is worth noting 
that no formal Congressional action has been taken to reign in ICANN since its inception, 
despite a lack of consensus (or a lack of interest) in Congress as to the propriety of 
ICANN’s work and legitimacy of its authority. 
There is an interesting question set aside here that has yet to be fully examined in the lit-
erature of Cyberlaw: to what extent should we regulate the Internet as a global public utility 
(in the general sense of the term “utility”)? If so, what implications would this insight have 
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viewing, among other issues, its implications for competition and data 
privacy.
122 Roughly seventy-five government representatives partici-
pate in ICANN through the Governmental Advisory Committee 
(“GAC”).
123 Academics, including members of the ICANN board, law 
professors, computer scientists, and public policy scholars, have writ-
ten about ICANN and participated in its formation. The news media 
has covered its establishment and growth. Hundreds of articles in the 
trade press, such as  Wired, C|Net, The Industry Standard, and Red 
Herring, both in print and online, have told ICANN’s story to tech-
nologists; mainstream newspapers, too, from cities around the world 
have published stories for the casual observer.
124 
Much of the reason why people care about ICANN — and the 
manner in which it governs and is governed — revolves, not surpris-
ingly, around a dwindling, but nonetheless substantial, amount of 
money.
125 Among other things, ICANN oversees the process by which  
second-level domain names are given out to businesses, NGOs, and 
anyone else who wants to establish a  website on the Internet. The 
power to assign and manage certain domain name registry systems 
turned Network Solutions into a corporation for which VeriSign was 
willing to pay $21 billion in 2000.
126 A single domain name, “busi-
ness.com,” is believed to have commanded a $7.5 million sale price, 
albeit at the height of the mania surrounding Internet expansionism.
127 
Applicants for the rights to manage new gTLDs anted up $50,000 
each to ICANN simply to put forward a proposal, with no claim to a 
refund in the event of failure.
128 Other aspects of ICANN’s work, such 
as setting certain technical standards, could have substantial additional 
                                                                                                    
122.  See  EU Plans ICANN Study,  HEISE  ONLINE  (Dec. 11, 2001),  at 
http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/23317. 
123.  See  Governmental Advisory Committee,  at  http://www.gacsecretariat.org/web/ 
index.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).  
124. Citations are far too numerous to mention exhaustively here. See, e.g., Internet Gov-
ernance: Domain Strain, supra note 113; Web Domain Group Skirts Controversy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at C4.  
125. The amount of money at stake with ICANN’s decisions in 2004 is surely lower than 
it was at the height of the Internet bubble, for instance, in March 2000. Still, a future is 
conceivable in which more and more money changes hands to reserve more and more d o-
main names across a broader range of gTLDs. One might also consider the sale price of 
Network Solutions to VeriSign (tens of billions of dollars) and the subsequent sale of assets 
of Network Solutions by VeriSign (hundreds of millions of dollars). 
126. See, e.g., Damien Cave, Is VeriSign a N etwork Solution?, SALON.COM (Mar. 8, 
2000), at http://www.salon.com/tech/log/2000/03/08/verisign_nsi/index.html.  
127.  See,  e.g.,  Amy Schein, Business.com, Inc.,  at  http://www.hoovers.com/ 
free/co/factsheet.xhtml?COID=103149  (last visited Feb.  23, 2004);  see  also Scott 
Rosenberg,  Their Names A re Legion,  SALON.COM  (Mar. 10, 2000),  at 
http://www.salon.com/tech/col/rose/2000/03/10/domain_names/index.html. A new round of 
gTLD proposals may be underway shortly as the seventh gTLD of the first round of gTLD 
extensions comes on line. 
128. ICANN reportedly collected $2.35 million through the new proposal process. See 
Mary Mosquera, Domain Name Space About to Burst Open, TECHWEB.COM (Oct. 31, 
2000), at http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20001031S0018. No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  435 
 
commercial importance. Though valuations of domain name-related 
entities and contractual rights have fallen markedly over the past few 
years, ICANN’s work nonetheless draws commercial interest. 
The fear of  “mission creep,” and the related concern about 
ICANN’s governance activities, also rank among the reasons for in-
terest in and concern about ICANN’s management structure.
129 
ICANN stands alone among global institutions with any claim to l e-
gitimacy in managing certain affairs related to the core systems of the 
Internet.
130 ICANN’s leadership has consistently downplayed this risk 
of mission creep and advocated “tight focus” on a narrow mandate.
131 
While its mandate is indeed limited today to the naming and number-
ing schemes, some observers (including members of the House and 
Senate of the U .S. Congress) have expressed fears that ICANN could 
extend its influence to other Internet governance tasks.
132 As remote 
as the possibility of “mission creep” may seem, and as believable as 
ICANN’s leaders may sound, as ICANN comes under increasing fire, 
this concern may have merit even if ICANN per se does not extend its 
reach.
133 Cyberspace may be different enough from terrestrial space 
that some other institution may seek to establish a claim to govern 
other matters online, such as civil liberties or other issues that may be 
more important to individual users of the Internet.
134 Related con-
cerns, like the fear that industrial societies will be seized by a techni-
cal elite, also feed into the importance of ICANN’s management 
despite its obscurity.
135 
                                                                                                    
129. See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE & THE CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., THE ICANN 
AT-LARGE  ELECTION  STUDY  (Jan. 2000),  at  http://www.commoncause.org/icann/ 
roundtable/background.htm. 
130. It is conceivable that the International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) might 
claim to be involved in roughly the same business, given its regulatory authority over as-
pects of the telephone numbering system. 
131.  STUART  LYNN,  PRESIDENT’S  REPORT:  ICANN — THE  CASE FOR  REFORM, 
INTERNET  CORPORATION FOR  ASSIGNED NAMES AND  NUMBERS ( Feb.  24, 2002),  at 
http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm. 
132. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 26–
27 (Gateway ed. 1962) (1861) (suggesting that in considering a structure of governance, one 
should consider not just the legitimate scope of what the entity is intended to cover by its 
mandate, but also those areas to which the entity might extend its reach for bad reasons). 
133. Curiously enough, Congress itself may contribute to this fear of mission creep with 
such proposals as the plan to mandate establishment of a “.kids” gTLD. Such a plan would 
require decisions about what content is appropriate for what audiences and would, by neces-
sity, involve monitoring and censoring certain speech. See, e.g., Patricia Jacobus, ICANN 
Staff Opposes “.kids,”  “.xxx” Domains,  C|NET (Nov. 10, 2000),  at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023_3-248455.html. 
134. See Hill, supra note 118. 
135. But see Harold Loeb, LIFE IN A TECHNOCRACY: WHAT IT MIGHT BE LIKE (Syracuse 
Univ. Press 1996) (1933). But see Technocracy, Inc., A Statement of the Social Objectives 
of Technocracy  (Mar. 1933),  at  http://www.technocracyinc.org/articles/ 
social-objectives.html (advocating a movement to replace politicians with engineers and 
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ICANN’s management structure matters, too, because of the need 
to develop new global governance structures for the technical archi-
tecture of the Internet.
136 Few issues are able to touch the lives of so 
many across such a broad geographical and functional spectrum, even 
indirectly, as ICANN’s mandate does. While the world’s societies are 
certainly divided into technology haves and have-nots,
137 often along 
purely economic lines, the breadth of Internet usage and transactions 
across national boundaries continues to expand, though not at the rate 
predicted a few years ago. ICANN is an institution that can potentially 
become relevant to the lives of people in every country in a way that 
few other institutions in history have.
138 This global reach highlights 
the potential importance of the ICANN experiment to the future of 
Internet governance. Some people care about ICANN’s management 
because they fear expanding U.S. hegemony, the English language, or 
the power of multinational corporations.
139 Others see ICANN’s po-
tential reach as an opportunity to energize Internet users across n a-
tional borders into forging a global  community and to test the 
Internet’s ability to power global democratic institutions. Those con-
cerned with how we will move forward in making technical govern-
ance decisions, particularly with the increased concern over abuse of 
the network by spammers and others, seek a new model for how to 
tackle this looming problem.
140 For all of these reasons, ICANN mat-
ters, and the outcome of its experiments in representation is worthy of 
scrutiny. 
                                                                                                    
136. See Farber, supra note 1 (arguing that “an intensive, international study be started at 
once, with a mandate to propose detailed and meaningful paths for the Internet’s develop-
ment, operations, and management”).  
137. The global digital divide is yet another issue that warrants extensive study of its 
own. The relevance of the digital divide in the ICANN context has yet to be explored exten-
sively in the Cyberlaw literature, though there has been some discussion of the limited par-
ticipatory role of developing countries in ICANN, despite substantial effort to reach out to 
leaders in developing countries on the part of ICANN’s staff, board, and activists. For ex-
ample, the number of votes cast in North America and Europe in the Election of 2000 
dwarfed the number of votes cast in Africa.  See  generally  Benton Foundation,  at 
http://www.benton.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2004);  Digital Divide Network,  at 
http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/sections/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) 
(discussing the digital divide, though not explicitly in the context of ICANN). 
138. Arguably the United Nations, numerous other treaty-based organizations, certain 
NGOs, churches, and empires have had comparable global reach to that of ICANN. 
139. See, e.g., GEORGE  MONBIOT,  CAPTIVE STATE: THE  CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF 
BRITAIN (2000); see also Captive S tate, at www.captivestate.com (last visited Mar. 5, 
2004); Williams, supra note 5. 
140. See also Kiri Blakeley, Spam: It’s Worse Than You Think, FORBES.COM (Nov. 11, 
2003), at http://www.forbes.com/2003/11/11/cz_kb_1111spam.html.  No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  437 
 
III. THE FAILURE OF THE EXPERIMENT IN LEGITIMACY 
THROUGH OPENNESS 
The crisis of legitimacy that spurred the Election of 2000 stems 
from ICANN’s failure to garner legitimacy of authority through open-
ness. The experiment in openness failed for two reasons: first, there 
was a fundamental confusion in what was meant by “openness,” and 
second, ICANN’s hybrid organizational form obscured the decision-
making process so that even if it had wanted to, ICANN’s leadership 
could not listen to Internet user input.  
A. Confusion about “Openness” 
At least three possible conceptions of what  “openness” means 
have clashed in the development of the ICANN model.
141 First, activ-
ists have sought openness in the sense of an ability not only to see but 
also to participate in the decision-making process. This activist sense 
of openness is roughly consistent with the view of certain scholars 
that ICANN ought to achieve openness in the Habermasian ideal: a 
high level of discourse prior to reaching decisions.
142 Second, some 
conceive of openness as a variant of leading free software guru Rich-
ard Stallman’s non-proprietary model of the development of intellec-
tual goods, in which the form of the final outcome is what matters 
most.
143 Openness, in this second sense, is about positive freedom to 
do whatever users want with the output of the process.
144 Third, yet 
others  have set forth an Eric Raymond-style production model, in 
which openness is meant as a process by which a good end is 
achieved.
145  
In the first sense of openness, ICANN is meant to be managed so 
as to allow people to see what is going on and to be heard when they 
                                                                                                    
141. This concept of the three clashing senses of “openness” is directly attributable to 
conversations with Professor Jonathan Zittrain during the development of this paper. A far 
more subtle view of meanings of openness in the context of standards setting may be found 
in Ken Krechmer, The Principles of Open Standards, STANDARDS ENG’G, Nov./Dec. 1998, 
at 1–6. 
142. The leading proponent of this position is Professor A. Michael Froomkin. See gen-
erally Froomkin, supra note 33. 
143. See Richard Stallman, Why “Free Software” Is Better than “Open Source,” in FREE 
SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M STALLMAN (Joshua Gag ed. 
2002),  available  at  http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html  (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
144. Id. It is essential to note that, in the free software context, the end user must abide by 
a series of rules set out in a “copy left” agreement and then subject future users of the code 
to identical requirements. 
145. See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR (1999),  available  at 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar (last revised Sept. 11, 
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express their opinions.
146  The activist understanding of openness 
hinges largely on the ability not just to see, but also meaningfully to 
affect the decision-making process.
147  Much of the criticism that 
ICANN has sustained to date has been proffered by those who believe 
that they were either excluded entirely from the process or afforded 
little meaningful voice in developing ICANN’s structure and sys-
tem.
148 One ICANN participant described the point at which he lost 
faith in ICANN: 
My belief in ICANN died when, at the Geneva meet-
ing, I was presented with an outline of what would 
actually happen, and watched that happen (specifi-
cally, but not exhaustively, watching an unelected 
board be appointed, then watching that board take its 
technical mandate and turn it into a regulatory vehi-
cle).
149 
This commentary suggests an activist understanding of the term 
“openness” in the ICANN context.  Openness, to these critics of 
ICANN, meant not only that one could watch things happen, but addi-
tionally that one could participate in the process of reaching the deci-
sion that instead was later presented as a fait accompli. 
In a related vein, other stakeholders have sought openness at 
ICANN in the sense of clarity and reliability of process.
150 This clarity 
is necessary to empower users wishing to contribute to the decision-
making process, and also to businesses seeking to make investments 
based upon the regulatory environment set up by ICANN. This com-
ment has arisen primarily in the context of proposals for the extension 
of gTLDs, in which those who favor particular extensions seek to de-
                                                                                                    
146. See  Tao of the IETF,  supra note  89;  IETF,  Overview of the IETF,  at 
http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
147. See Leon Koay & Michael Richardson,  Openness and Transparency,  at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/workshops/LA/papers/openness.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2004) (describing some early criticisms of ICANN’s lack of openness in terms of preventing 
understanding of, or access to, the decision-making process). 
148. ICANN’t Believe What They’re Doing, supra note 58 (“ICANN Interim President 
Mike Roberts said most of the criticism of his group relates to ‘process’. . . .”). 
149. Posting of Christopher Ambler, cambler@iodesign.com, to  bwg-n-
friends@fibertron.com (Oct. 14, 1999) (on file with author). This  generally very well-
informed critic, Christopher Ambler, may have had his facts incorrect: there was no ICANN 
at the time nor has there been a Geneva ICANN meeting; he is likely referring to an Interna-
tional Forum on the White Paper meeting in July 1998. See IFWP-Geneva Archive,  at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/ifwp-geneva-archive (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). 
150.  See,  e.g., Bret Fausett,  My Public Comment  (Oct. 30, 2003),  at 
http://blog.lextext.com/blog/_archives/2003/10/30/5324.html ( arguing, as  counsel to 
NextDNS, in favor of “clarity” in the process of assigning new top-level domains). No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  439 
 
termine the level of risk associated with the investment necessary to 
propose a new gTLD.
151 
The second and third potential meanings of openness in the Inter-
net lexicon — the Stallman-style and Raymond-style versions, for 
short — have been less prevalent in the discourse but certainly pre-
sent. The Stallman-style version of openness, in which the output is 
meant to be free, as in non-proprietary, is hard to square with the na-
ture of what ICANN is doing. In the sense that ICANN seeks to allo-
cate a series of necessarily proprietary resources, a non-proprietary 
series of outcomes is inherently difficult to achieve in ICANN’s con-
text.
152 To maintain a stable system, ICANN can direct requests for 
cocacola.com to only one address on the Internet. This conceptual 
difficulty is revealed in the reaction to the Free Software Foundation’s 
proposal, over Stallman’s signature, to develop a  “.gnu” top-level 
domain.
153 ICANN has not achieved openness in the sense of non-
proprietary outcomes of the decision-making process. 
In the Raymond-style conception of openness, the goal is to 
achieve the best outcome through a non-proprietary process.
154 It is in 
this sense of openness that ICANN might be  defended most vigor-
ously. ICANN has certainly enabled many members of the user com-
munity to participate in the development of its process, either through 
involvement in a Supporting Organization or by making comments 
directly to the board. Likewise, one might reasonably contend that the 
outcome of ICANN’s work has been at least acceptable, and surely far 
better than it might have been. If the notion of openness is that the 
development of goods ought to involve as many users as possible to 
produce the highest-quality output possible — without prescribing 
precisely the manner in which the output is developed or prejudging 
its outcome — ICANN fares reasonably well.
155 
                                                                                                    
151. See Public Statement from the Internet Challenge to Afilias, Neulevel, ICANN, and 
DoC (Apr. 5, 2002), at http://www.gtldregistries.org/mailing/gtld/200204/0014.html (refer-
ring to a “lack of openness” in the gTLD context); see also STUART LYNN, A PLAN FOR 
ACTION REGARDING NEW G TLDS (Oct. 18, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/committees/ 
ntepptf/new-gtld-action-plan-18oct02.htm (describing the process for i ntroducing new 
gTLDs). 
152. I have found no evidence to suggest that Richard Stallman himself argued in favor 
of an ICANN that is open in the sense that I ascribe to him here. I mean only to refer to an 
important understanding of the term “openness” for which he has become a standard-bearer.  
153. See Richard Stallman, ICANN Yokohama Meeting Topic: Introduction of New 
Top-Level Domains Expression of Interest #12 (July 10, 2000), at http://www.icann.org/ 
yokohama/eoi12.htm;  see  also  FSF Proposes .gnu TLD to ICANN,  SLASHDOT,  at 
http://slashdot.org/articles/00/07/12/1710226.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) (reacting to 
the proposal). 
154. As with Stallman, I have no reason to believe that Eric Raymond has taken such a 
position with respect to ICANN; rather I credit him with development of a certain wide-
spread strand of thinking about what the term “open” means. 
155. Stakeholder opinion is far from unanimous on this particular point. See, e.g., Farber, 
supra note 1 (arguing that ICANN’s management of the DNS is inferior to many alterna-
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This confusion has caused a fundamental problem for ICANN’s 
experiment in legitimacy through openness. ICANN’s leadership 
seems to have  adopted the Raymond-style conception of openness, 
whereas the Internet user community and ICANN’s critics have 
adopted the activist sense of openness.  
B. The Limits of Public Input in Decision Making at ICANN 
ICANN’s leadership has expended a great deal of effort to live up 
to its founding principle of openness. However, this effort was crip-
pled by the misunderstanding between ICANN’s leadership and the 
Internet user community over the meaning of “openness.” ICANN’s 
leadership was able to achieve a Raymond-style openness by includ-
ing many people through its public message boards, but a systematic 
review of public input on a series of key issues suggests that users 
could not reasonably think that ICANN was open in the activist sense 
of the word.
156 Even when the majority o f users agreed on a given 
                                                                                                    
156. This review, examining the majority of public commentary on ICANN’s online fo-
rums, was conducted by the Berkman Center over the past year. For a web-based compila-
tion of the data, see John Palfrey et al., Public Participation in ICANN: A Preliminary 
Study, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School,  at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/publicparticipation (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).  
Methodology: After selecting publicly archived mailing lists and forum.icann.org, see in-
fra note 161 and accompanying text, as the focus of our research, we wrote a collection of 
Perl scripts that systematically downloaded and sorted approximately 100,000 mailing list e-
mails and forum comments. The data we gathered do not reflect all discourse that took place 
in the mailing list and on forum.icann.org; some archives are no longer available online and 
human error may have led to the omission of other undiscovered data sets. We collected 
data from all of the forum.icann.org web pages published before July 1, 2003 and all of the 
mailing lists with archives on the DNSO/GNSO web pages.  
After downloading and sorting the data, we performed a channel analysis, in which we 
graphically inspected the data from a variety of sub-populations to find out whether a ran-
dom sample was appropriate. We determined mathematically that the public comments that 
we reviewed represented a Pareto distribution. We then selected four issues that we deter-
mined to be fairly representative of the types of decisions that ICANN has made. 
In analyzing each of our four target issues, we decided at the outset whether it was feasi-
ble to analyze every available comment within our population of interest or to sample from 
the population. When fewer than 400 comments were made regarding an issue, we included 
all of the comments in our analysis. When more than 400 comments were posted, we ran-
domly sampled from the population of comments. Sample sizes were calculated at 95% 
confidence levels with a confidence interval of plus/minus 5%. If a distribution was particu-
larly skewed — when a few users post a significant portion of the comments — we sampled 
the data twice: once for the opinions of the majority of users, and once for the opinions of 
the heavy users. The sample sizes for these bifurcated populations were calculated at the 
same power levels as the original sample sizes. For all of the instances where this was a 
concern, we discovered that the users dominating the conversation were predominantly 
posting off-topic messages or “flames” irrelevant to the serious consideration of a given 
matter. We have sought to include only comments that we deemed to be substantive in the 
presentation of our issue analysis data.  
Researchers familiar with the issues, but generally unfamiliar with the individuals posting 
comments to the message boards, coded each comment within the context of the issue being 
analyzed. What the rater looked for in each post directly reflected the issue that was being 
discussed on that particular board. If, for example, the message board was intended to gauge No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  441 
 
issue, they could not presume that their input would substantially im-
pact the decision-making process of ICANN’s board.
157 In some in-
stances, input from the user community may have had an impact upon 
the outcome of a given decision, but the data suggest that the board 
tended to rely more heavily upon staff recommendations and the input 
of the Supporting Organizations  (in which users may also partici-
pate).
158 The Internet user community could not reliably expect that 
their input through these online forums would result in board consid-
eration of their interests. In other instances, too few public comments 
were posted to provide a strong indication of Internet user community 
support.
159 These findings reaffirm, at least to a limited extent, the 
intuition of the many critics who have questioned the extent to which 
ICANN has lived up to its principle of openness.
160 In light of these 
findings, reform of the ICANN decision-making structure should, at a 
minimum, clarify the channels for input from the user community to 
the decision makers and ensure that user expectations about the effect 
of their input are met. 
ICANN has opened a range of Internet-based channels through 
which members of the global Internet user community may submit 
comments to ICANN’s leadership about matters general and specific. 
Two of these channels were the focus of this consideration of public 
participation at ICANN: the public, Internet-based mailing lists and 
the topically  oriented web-posting spaces.
161 These channels have 
been widely used as a means of participation and have been largely 
                                                                                                    
support for the implementation of VeriSign’s proposed Wait-Listing System, comments 
were tabulated as supportive of the proposal, in opposition to the proposal, or off-topic. If a 
rater experienced difficulty determining the intention of the posting user, a second rater was 
brought in to collaborate and, in all cases, consensus was reached as to the intention of the 
user. We performed a quality-assurance check of our data analysis, in which a researcher 
other than the initial researcher reviewed the raw and compiled data. Prior to this publica-
tion, I presented draft, initial findings of these data in three settings: before a group of Inter-
net law professors in August 2003, at a seminar on Internet governance at the Kennedy 
School of Government in October 2003, and at a research meeting of fellows at the Berk-
man Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School in November 2003. 
157. Id. 
158. In many instances, users chose to contribute their ideas through the Supporting Or-
ganizations. However, for the purposes of our study, it is extremely difficult to differentiate 
user input from the input of large group interests, such as the corporate interests. 
159. Consider, for instance, the thin volume of commentary on the reassignment of the 
“.org” domain from VeriSign to a new operator. It is hard to know whether to blame 
ICANN or the global Internet user community for the fact that there was such anemic public 
commentary posted about such an important issue. One hypothesis is that users recognize 
that even their substantive comments are ignored by ICANN’s board. On the contrary, how-
ever, users have continued to post commentary regarding ICANN’s reform proposals well 
after the reassignment of the “.org” top-level domain came up for a vote before the ICANN 
board. In any event, the paucity of comments in some cases points to the inadequacy of 
these online forums alone to solicit and incorporate Internet user community input in the 
decision-making process of such an institution. 
160. See Koay & Richardson, supra note 147.  
161. For the primary example of these web-posting spaces, see ICANN Public Forum, at 
http://forum.icann.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). 442   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
archived online, allowing for a relatively reliable data set for analy-
sis.
162 This study involved a review of approximately 100,000 mes-
sages between late 1998 and July 1, 2003. We chose to analyze four 
topics of broad interest to the Internet community. On these four top-
ics, we considered both the direct user input to the ICANN board of 
directors as well as the other forms of input that the board considered, 
such as recommendations from the Supporting Organizations and out-
side experts. This study demonstrates that users cannot reasonably 
presume that their input through these two channels, even when the 
user community overwhelmingly supports a certain position, might 
affect the board’s decision making. Based on this review, these public 
forums for global user community participation do not contribute 
meaningfully to an open and representative ICANN decision-making 
process.  
The four topics considered closely in this study are: (1) the intro-
duction of new top-level domains in 2000 (both contested and non-
contested extensions),  (2) the VeriSign Global Registry Services 
(“VGRS”) proposal, (3) the reassignment of the “.org” domain from 
its legacy provider to a new provider, and (4) the proposal to reform 
the ICANN management structure. We chose these topics for a variety 
of reasons, which include the relative interest shown by the Internet 
user community in their outcome (as demonstrated by the number and 
seriousness of the public comments), and because these topics repre-
sent four types of decisions that ICANN periodically makes in fulfill-
ing its mandate of technical governance. 
This review’s bottom line is that the tenor of public commentary 
regarding a proposal before the board does not correlate strongly to an 
outcome either for or against that proposal. In several of the instances 
that we reviewed, the board voted against the position adopted by the 
majority of users who commented. Other types of input to the  board, 
such as the recommendation of a relevant Supporting Organization or 
of a hired technical reviewer, correlate more strongly to the board’s 
ultimate decision. 
                                                                                                    
162. Critics of the methodology involved in this research point to this data set as the 
wrong place to look for the answers to questions about public participation in ICANN. To 
some extent, this critique is right on: there are many means of public participation in 
ICANN, and the public mailing lists and online discussion forums are among the least im-
portant compared to, for instance, the Supporting Organizations. These data are analyzed 
here because they are reliable and can be quantified, as compared to public inputs through 
the Supporting Organizations, which are less direct, and much harder to analyze. The fact 
that more than 100,000 posts have been published by thousands of Internet users around the 
world represents at least some effort on the part of the posters to engage in the ICANN 
decision-making process.  For a formal rebuttal of this study, see Andrew McLaughlin, The 
Virtues of Deliberative Policymaking: A Response to “Public Participation  
in ICANN”  (Dec. 17, 2003),  at  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/mclaughlin/ 
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First, we considered the process for introduction of new gTLDs in 
2000.
163 ICANN’s initial i ntroduction of new  gTLDs was eagerly 
awaited and hotly contested, as forty-seven applicants submitted pro-
posals for new gTLDs.
164 There were two classes of gTLD proposals: 
those that were uncontested, in which only one a pplicant sought a 
given new gTLD, and those that were contested, in which more than 
one applicant sought a given new gTLD. In each instance, the pro-
posed new gTLD was evaluated via a threshold review to sort out 
those proposals that met initial technical and financial requirements. 
One of those criteria was public comment. ICANN’s board considered 
each proposal against a series of criteria, ultimately choosing seven 
new  gTLDs. In some cases, new  gTLDs chosen had substantially 
more favorable than negative public commentary, as in the case of the 
“.coop” gTLD. In others, such as the contested “.biz” consideration, 
ICANN’s board chose the only proposal, that of JV Team LLC (now 
NeuLevel), with more negative than positive public commentary. 
Some proposals that met the threshold review and received more posi-
tive than negative  commentary from the public (e.g.,  “.dir” and 
“.geo”) were not chosen as new gTLDs. Finally, certain proposals 
with substantially more positive public commentary than negative 
commentary, but which did not meet the threshold standards, such as 
“.law,” were not chosen as new gTLDs. No particular pattern of sup-
port or non-support based on public commentary emerges from these 
data. 
Second, we analyzed the process by which ICANN considered 
VeriSign’s proposal for a new wait-listing service.
165 During a special 
meeting of the board on August 23, 2002, ICANN voted to implement 
the V GRS. The public commentary was overwhelmingly opposed to 
the introduction of the wait-listing service. The Names Council, 
adopting a report developed by the  Domain Names Supporting O r-
ganization  (“DNSO”) Transfers Task Force, also recommended 
against this proposal.
166 ICANN’s general counsel mentioned that 
certain legitimate business interests might be endangered if the VGRS 
wait-listing service proposal were adopted, but did not directly oppose 
the proposal. Despite the strong objections expressed by those who 
                                                                                                    
163. See generally ICANN, Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), at http://www.icann.org/tlds 
(last modified Dec. 16, 2003); ICANN,  New TLD Program Application Archive,  at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/app-index.htm (last updated Nov. 27, 2000). 
164. ICANN’s second round of new gTLDs began in 2003. See [council] New gTLDs 
Committee — Timeline (Feb. 3, 2003), at http://does-not-exist.org/mail-archives/council/ 
msg00375.html, rendering the review of the first round particularly relevant.  
165. See  VERISIGN  GLOB AL  REGISTRY  SERVS.,  DOMAIN  NAME  
WAIT  LISTING  SERVICE   (Mar. 20, 2002),  at  http://www.icann.org/bucharest/ 
vgrs-wls-proposal-20mar02.pdf. 
166. DOMAIN NAMES SUPPORTING ORG., FINAL REPORT OF THE TRANSFER TASK FORCE 
ON THE  WLS  PROPOSAL (July 14, 2002),  at  http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/ 
20020714.TFtransfer-WLS-report.html. 444   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
submitted public commentary and the opposition of the Names Coun-
cil and the DNSO Transfers Task Force, the ICANN board passed the 
VGRS waiting-list service proposal.  
Third, we reviewed ICANN’s reassignment of the “.org” domain 
from VeriSign to a new operator.
167 On October 14, 2002, the ICANN 
board  approved  a proposal from the Internet Society  to  succeed 
VeriSign as operator of the  “.org” domain.
168 On this topic, the 
ICANN board sought input from four recognized groups
169 who con-
tributed to the staff evaluation of eleven applicants. The Internet Soci-
ety received strong reviews from these recognized groups. The public 
commentary, which was relatively sparse, favored IMS/ISC, an appli-
cant that failed. IMS/ISC did not meet the technical requirements set 
forth by Gartner. The Internet Society received more positive than 
negative comments, but at a less favorable ratio than IMS/ISC. In this 
instance, the public comments may have played a minor role  in the 
board’s choice of Internet Society as successor for the .org domain, 
but the anemic level of public participation
170 meant that the technical 
advice of Gartner likely had the largest impact on the board’s deci-
sion. 
Finally, we considered the proposal to reform ICANN’s structure 
in 2002. This reform process began in earnest when then-President 
Lynn published his Case for Reform
171 in February 2002 and contin-
ued through the publication of a Blueprint for Reform,
172 which sum-
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marized the findings of the Evolution and Reform Committee.
173 
While there was no single board vote in favor of or against any single 
element of reform, ICANN has moved roughly in the direction of 
Lynn’s proposal. However, throughout the reform process, the public 
commentary has been almost universally opposed to Lynn’s sugges-
tions and the reforms that the board has implemented. They have been 
particularly opposed to the move away from an At-Large Membership 
toward a less-direct method of public participation in choosing board 
members. Much of this opposition has expressed anger at ICANN’s 
abandonment of all elements of representative democracy. The At-
Large Advisory Committee (chaired by Esther Dyson), which was 
designed to represent the user community, submitted a final report 
that recommended changes quite similar to the Lynn proposals. There 
is no evidence that the  board has d irectly taken the Internet user 
community’s input into consideration throughout this ongoing reform 
process. 
Our review of the Internet community’s input through the public 
commentary process is not the only consideration of this general 
topic. A study by Professor Ethan Katsch and Dr. Alan Gaitenby, re-
searchers at the University of Massachusetts, focused on the specific 
ICANN process called the Request for Reconsideration.
174 This policy 
allows that “[a]ny person affected by an action of the [ICANN] may 
request review or reconsideration of that action by the board of Direc-
tors.”
175 Katsch and Gaitenby concluded, “If there are problems with 
the process, the problem is more with ICANN than with any users of 
the process.”
176 ICANN responded to twenty-six Requests for Recon-
sideration with formal decisions, rejecting all but one.
177 
Our review of the correlation between public input and board de-
cisions is neither a complete study — as there is much more data that 
could be considered, particularly with respect to the Supporting Or-
ganizations — nor a statement about whether the board reached a 
sound decision on any given matter. The board may in fact have 
reached the right decision to fulfill its narrow technical mission in 
every instance, which would constitute success in the Raymond-style 
conception of openness. The same might be said of ICANN’s deci-
sions in the R equest for Reconsideration process. However, even if 
ICANN made the right decision in every instance, it still loses legiti-
macy of authority with every decision, because it based its legitimacy 
on openness and representation and has failed to live up to these prin-
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ciples, at least if we construe them strictly. Given the rhetoric of its 
founders and current leadership, ICANN must confront the frustration 
felt by the Internet community when they do not feel heard, despite 
assurances to the contrary.
178 
IV. THE FAILURE OF ICANN’S EXPERIMENT IN 
REPRESENTATION 
When it became apparent that ICANN’s experiment in openness 
was failing, ICANN shifted its focus to representation in an attempt to 
salvage its legitimacy of authority. With the Election of 2000, ICANN 
made a move toward becoming a more formally representative body. 
However, this  approach  failed  spectacularly.  Instead of making 
ICANN into a representative government entity, it made ICANN into 
a semidemocracy. Its semidemocratic form not only failed to address 
ICANN’s problem of legitimacy, it also brought along a host of its 
own problems. 
A. The Election of 2000 
This one-time election was one manifestation of the struggle 
among ICANN’s participants to craft the answers to the thorny ques-
tions regarding ICANN’s  legitimacy. The lack of clarity  about 
ICANN’s structure and the source of its authority offers room for 
those with an agenda to impose it on the organization. The group that 
championed the At-Large Membership and elected directors was one 
of the most vocal groups of ICANN participants.
179 Many members of 
this group are individual technologists or Internet users; some mem-
bers also work for large corporations, NGOs, or other powerful enti-
ties. 
The activities of the former At-Large Membership and premise 
behind the Elections of 2000 are largely consistent with the overall 
goals and principles of ICANN, particularly with the goal of represen-
tation.
180 Any person with Internet access who wished to become a 
member had the opportunity to do so during an open enrollment pe-
riod by accessing the ICANN website and submitting a short form.
181 
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Instructions were translated from English into Chinese, Japanese, 
French, German, Korean, Portuguese, and Spanish. ICANN then 
mailed a letter to the registrant’s physical address to verify that each 
member existed as a discrete individual. The letters included  PIN 
numbers that could be used prior to September 8, 2000, to activate 
membership and voting rights.
182 Those who registered then had the 
right to vote in a global, online election to select members to the 
board of directors. Candidates could nominate themselves prior to an 
August 14, 2000, deadline. Once nominated, they needed to secure 
not only support from residents of two or more countries, but also the 
support of twenty individuals, or two percent of the At-Large Mem-
bers in his or her geographic region (whichever was greater). In Octo-
ber 2000, five directors were elected from distinct geographic regions 
(Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and North America). These five directors served on the nineteen-
member  board, with full and equal powers relative to other  board 
members, until their terms ended on December 15, 2002. The At-
Large Membership process was intended to make ICANN more repre-
sentative by enabling any person who uses the Internet to have a for-
mal voice in the management of ICANN.
183 The Election of 2000 
used an online interface and an Instant Runoff Voting system, using 
Election.com technology.
184 
The mechanics of registering voters, running the nomination and 
campaign period, as well as the actual  election, went more  or less 
smoothly, though some voters experienced frustrations in the proc-
ess.
185 During the registration period, some would-be members e x-
perienced difficulties in accessing the ICANN server and using their 
mailed PINs.
186 At the time of the voting, “‘A few of the more than 
76,000 at-large members discovered their online votes were not being 
accepted by the online voting booth,’ said ICANN’s Chief Policy Of-
ficer Andrew McLaughlin.”
187 Contemporary reports suggested that 
about 400 members may have been affected by this difficulty.
188 It is 
unclear, however, if any of these voters then decided not to vote or in 
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fact returned later to submit their ballots. These mechanical problems, 
while necessary to be addressed in future Internet-based elections, do 
not appear so serious as to suggest that global online elections are 
unfeasible.
189 
The At-Large Membership drive and Election of 2000 were 
deemed a success by ICANN staff and by some observers at the time 
of their completion.
190 “With over 76,000 activated members,” the 
ICANN site proclaims, “ICANN achieved its goal of a large, globally 
diverse membership.”
191 Of the 158,000 people who signed up for At-
Large Membership online during the summer of 2000, 76,000 persons 
activated their membership and established voting rights. Of t hose 
eligible to vote, 34,035 cast valid ballots.
192 Those voters represented 
a 45% turnout of those eligible and a 22% turnout of those who initi-
ated the registration process. Of the world’s estimated 375 million 
Internet users at the time, less than 0.01 percent voted in the ICANN 
Election of 2000, with only 130 ballots cast from the continent of Af-
rica.
193  
The Election of 2000 resulted in the ascendancy to the ICANN 
board of five individuals from the five geographic regions, as prom-
ised, to fill just over o ne quarter of the ICANN  board seats. Nii 
Quaynor of Ghana won with 67 of the 130 ballots cast from the Africa 
region.
194 Masanobu Katoh of Japan won with 13,913 of the 17,745 
votes cast from the Asia / Australia / Pacific region.
195 Andy Mueller-
Maguhn of Germany won with 5,948 of the 11,309 votes cast in 
Europe.
196 Ivan Moura Campos of Brazil won with 946 of 1,402 bal-
lots cast in the Latin American / Caribbean region.
197 Karl Auerbach 
of the United States won with 1,074 of the 3,449 votes cast in North 
America.
198 T hese representatives of the At-Large Membership 
played an active role in ICANN’s management after their election, 
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including vocal participation at ICANN board meetings.
199 Two of 
these directors, Auerbach  and Mueller-Maguhn, had longstanding 
records as outspoken critics of ICANN’s management prior to their 
election to the board.
200 
Both ICANN itself and outside organizations conducted formal 
studies of the Election of 2000 and of the At-Large Membership. The 
two most important of these studies — ICANN’s own At-Large Mem-
bership report, and a report led by academics and the Center for De-
mocracy and Technology, an NGO in Washington, D.C. — reached 
markedly different conclusions about what the election experiment 
suggested for ICANN’s f uture.
201 ICANN announced an At-Large 
Membership Study Committee on January 26, 2001,
202 with a goal of 
reporting back to the board of ICANN in November 2001.
203 ICANN 
planned a formal two-year review to consider the propriety of the At-
Large Membership, but this was roundly criticized as too slow and as 
potentially undercutting the At-Large Membership itself; the latter 
critique proved accurate.
204 The Center for Democracy and Technol-
ogy, also has conducted a study in collaboration with Common Cause, 
a well-respected N GO based in the United States.
205 These studies, 
however, managed neither to address the core issues of representation 
within ICANN, nor to clarify the meaning of “representation” within 
the ICANN structure. 
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On some level, the ICANN Election of 2000 was historic. A  sui 
generis, not-for-profit corporation held elections for five board mem-
bers in which 76,000 people from most parts of the globe participated 
using Internet-based technology.
206 Those who organized the election 
were conscious of its potential historical place. “The At Large Mem-
bers of ICANN will be participating in a historic first — a worldwide 
online election to choose Directors for the Internet’s private-sector 
technical coordinating body.”
207 ICANN’s feat is remarkable on its 
face.
208 ICANN’s election of five of nineteen directors, with a goal of 
creating a representative organization, however, is unsettling when 
considered from the perspective of political theory.  
B. Why ICANN’s Semidemocratic Structure Was Doomed to Fail 
The combination of ICANN’s curious structure and its uncon-
vincing attempts in representing the global Internet community has 
left ICANN in the awkward, unsustainable position of a semidemoc-
racy. ICANN’s semidemocratic structure poses serious problems for 
the organization over the long term. These problems could include 
capture by powerful interests, directors who do not represent the 
Internet community at large, a disengaged user community, and diffi-
cult transition periods. Finally, its semidemocratic structure has left 
ICANN without a solution to its problem of legitimacy. 
1. ICANN as a Semidemocracy 
In the wake of the Election of 2000, ICANN’s mixed board of di-
rectors — with five elected and fourteen non-elected directors —
placed the organization into the nebulous zone occupied by semi-
democracies, partway between the authoritarian and pluralistic models 
of governance. Even without the directly elected directors, ICANN’s 
hybrid structure is semidemocratic. This authoritarian-pluralist model 
is characterized by a situation in which “the party or other governing 
group retains a monopoly on political power but is willing to grant a 
measure of political and cultural freedom at the individual, group, and 
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regional levels.”
209 One way to retell the story of ICANN’s develop-
ment is that the non-elected board members (and those chosen by the 
Supporting Organizations) continued to retain all political power. Al-
though they temporarily acceded to the user community’s demands 
for directly elected board members, they then removed those directors 
after only a single term.
210 
The semidemocratic model fits ICANN particularly well, not just 
in light of the Election of 2000, but also from the perspective of 
ICANN’s corporate form. The board of directors retains absolute con-
trol over the decision-making process (or “monopoly power” in the 
sense that a political scientist uses the term). However, the board has 
the flexibility to grant the managers and other stakeholders, such as 
the Supporting Organizations, the freedom to act. For instance, the 
board delegates certain spending powers which allow the managers 
independently to authorize expenditures, similar to how an ordinary 
corporate or non-profit board would empower its managers. The staff 
and outside counsel can negotiate on behalf of the  board with key 
partners, such  as VeriSign, and present agreements to the board for 
consideration, discussion, and subsequent approval, as they did at the 
Melbourne  board meeting in March 2001.
211  Supporting Organiza-
tions are also empowered to make recommendations to the board.
212 
This at least suggests the possibility that parties other than the board 
and staff members are participating in the governance process.  
One take on the Election of 2000 and its aftermath is that ICANN 
should be lauded for its move toward semidemocracy. Those who 
believe that direct representation is the best structure for ICANN 
viewed the Election of 2000 as a first step in the right direction. The 
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logical progression would be for ICANN to gravitate from a fully ap-
pointed board to a fully elected board. In this progression, the Election 
of 2000 would be followed by a subsequent election to bring the next 
four elected m embers onto the board. After that experiment has 
proven itself a success, ICANN might move towards electing all its 
board members via the At-Large Membership. ICANN could capital-
ize on the success of its most recent election to build greater legiti-
macy across the globe through a model of deliberation and 
inclusion.
213 ICANN would thus  be empowering the Internet user 
community to participate in the governance process. This incremental 
and hopeful view, however, is unconvincing in light of historical ex-
periences with semidemocracies; it is also highly unlikely at this point 
that ICANN will, or should, move toward a purely democratic 
model.
214  
From the other end of the spectrum, the harshest criticism of the 
Election of 2000 posits that ICANN’s move toward semidemocracy is 
nothing more than an instance of “placative politics.”
215 The ICANN 
board, the theory goes, has sustained so much criticism from a vocal 
opposition in the press, on the Web, and in meetings that it sought a 
means of placating the user community. The most obvious means is to 
enable the user community to elect representatives to the board who, 
even when voting in a bloc, cannot effect change within the institu-
tion. The sole aim of such an election process is to placate the vocal 
critics — perhaps even landing some such critics in positions of nomi-
nal authority — with no intention of ceding any real power to the user 
community. Potentially, once the elected representatives behave 
poorly, or interest in electing powerless representatives wanes, the 
board can revert to its pure non-elected form.
216 Even without fully 
reverting to a non-elected board, the placative approach might manage 
to squelch public interest in ICANN. In Professor Roberto Unger’s 
terms, placative politics involve “the adoption of rules and practices 
maintaining society at a relatively low level of political mobilization,” 
with the goal of securing “property against populism.”
217 A number of 
                                                                                                    
213. See Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67–94 
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).  
214. See discussion infra Section V.A. 
215. “Placative politics” is intended to convey a political modus operandi that aims 
mainly to placate, but not necessarily to empower, those with a stake in the outcome under 
consideration. This notion was developed during a series of conversations with Professor 
Jonathan Zittrain.  
216. Again, one must consider whether the representatives of the Supporting Organiza-
tions are properly thought of as “representing” anyone. To the extent that the Supporting 
Organizations continue to send members to the board, the semidemocratic structure argua-
bly remains intact, even absent the directly elected representatives. 
217. ROBERTO M. UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 
264 (1998). No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  453 
 
ICANN critics, fearing a similar lack of commitment from the board 
toward moving further in the direction of direct representation, called 
for the immediate resignation of the board’s “squatters” and for the 
election of the next four board members through the At-Large Mem-
bership system.
218 
The political history of the second half of the twentieth century 
suggests that either model could be right.
219 Those who think in terms 
of U.S. and democratic triumphalism tend to think of semidemocra-
cies as mere way stations between authoritarian or totalitarian regimes 
and the ultimate end-state of representative democracies. History of-
fers a few such transitions of various completeness, including but not 
limited to a number of Eastern European states and certain countries 
in South America in the late twentieth century.
220 Of these examples, 
Chile and Brazil may serve as the best examples of the gradual transi-
tion through semidemocracy toward an ultimately democratic r e-
gime.
221 South Africa over the past decade presents a particularly 
graphic example, though with a spin on the same notion of transition. 
In South Africa, the change took the form of a fairly abrupt movement 
from exclusion to inclusion of racial minorities, rather than a gradual 
transition from autocratic to democratic structures.
222 In contrast, ex-
amples from East Asia, such as Malaysia and Singapore, may lead to 
the conclusion that semidemocracy is a final or semi-permanent stage 
rather than merely a phase in a long-term transition.
223 
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http://personal.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/boardsquat.htm; A. Michael Froomkin, Replacing 
the ICANN Board Squatters (Nov. 9, 2000),  at  http://personal.law.miami.edu/ 
~froomkin/boardsquat2.htm; see also David McGuire, ICANN Antagonist Calls for Board 
Resignations,  NEWSBYTES  NEWS  NETWORK   (Oct. 30, 2000),  at 
http://www.computeruser.com/news/00/10/30/news8.html; Press Release, ICANN, ICANN 
Announces Names of Directors to Serve Extended Terms,  at  http://www.icann.org/ 
announcements/icann-pr27oct00.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003) (announcing the apparently 
arbitrary extension of four of the directors’ terms into 2002 rather than having those direc-
tors resign and be elected by the At-Large Membership). 
219.  See  generally  PAUL  BROOKER,  NON  DEMOCRATIC  REGIMES:  THEORY, 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (2000). 
220.  See  generally  CONSTITUTIONALISM IN  TRANSFORMATION:  EUROPEAN AND 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996).  
221. Andreas Schedler,  Concepts of Democratic Consolidation (Apr. 19, 1997),  at 
http://136.142.158.105/LASA97/schedler.pdf.  See  generally  UNGER,  supra note  217; 
ELISABETH J. WOOD, FORGING DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW: INSURGENT TRANSITIONS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA AND EL SALVADOR (2000). 
222.  See generally TIMOTHY D.  SISK,  DEMOCRATIZATION IN  SOUTH  AFRICA:  THE 
ELUSIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1995); WOOD, supra note 221. 
223. I find it hard to analogize further between ICANN and these political historical ex-
amples, in part because it is a challenge to know whether ICANN is headed toward or away 
from a democratic model. When the first five directly elected representatives of the At-
Large Membership joined the board, one might have made an argument that ICANN was 
inclining away from an authoritarian model and towards a democratic model. Since the end 
of the At-Large Election experiment, it appears as though ICANN is zigzagging in precisely 
the opposite direction. One of the central themes of this paper is that ICANN should stop 454   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
The effort to apply the political histories of modern nation-states 
to the study of ICANN is fraught with problems and is ultimately in-
conclusive. The difficulty of using case studies of this sort traces back 
to the fact that the parallel between ICANN and a nation-state is im-
perfect. ICANN is a new institution, and potentially a new kind of 
institution, filling a perplexing new void rather than replacing an old 
institution with a new one.
224 Even if the parallels hold up under scru-
tiny, examples from political history present an unclear conclusion as 
to whether semidemocracies are way stations or endpoints. The period 
between the Election of 2000 and the end of the elected directors’ 
terms at the close of 2002, however, has seen a pull-back away from 
the expansion of democratic decision making, not a continued push in 
the pro-democratic direction. ICANN itself is rapidly becoming an 
example of the perils of the semidemocratic structure. 
2. Problems Facing ICANN as a Semidemocracy 
If the most recent statement from the U.S. Department of Com-
merce when renewing its M oU with ICANN is to be believed, 
ICANN likely will not undertake radical reform of its structure, but 
rather persist with some variant of its hybrid form.
225 From the per-
spective of political theory, such persistence may not be a good idea. 
Political theory offers a picture with less ambiguity than political his-
tory and provides support for the harsher and less promising view of 
ICANN’s semidemocratic, hybrid structure. ICANN’s particular 
semidemocratic structure may have led, and may continue to lead, to 
problems that can be categorized into two tiers of concerns. The first-
tier concern — capture without recourse — seems to be the most 
likely and the most worrisome outcome, while second-tier concerns 
are worth noting but present less likely and less severe potential prob-
lems.  
a. The First-Tier Concern: Capture Without Recourse 
The fear of capture is the most prevalent concern for any organ-
izational structure without strong democratic safeguards or other ob-
                                                                                                    
careening and start again from the beginning by establishing new principles, determining a 
defensible source of authority, and adopting a structure that suits its mandate. 
224. One might argue that the parallel between states in transition and ICANN has merit, 
given that many of these insurgencies are viewed as popular uprisings against entrenched 
economic interests. This mirrors the rise of the At-Large Membership, which can be seen as 
the Internet community striking back against the entrenched economic interests of the regis-
tries, registrars, and other Internet corporate interests. 
225. See Statement Regarding MoU, supra note 5 (suggesting that ICANN ought to con-
tinue to seek reform, but also “complete the transition of DNS management to the private 
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vious methods of checks and balances.
226 A semidemocratic regime, 
in which the broad community may not affect policy even if they act 
as a single voting bloc, is inherently subject to capture. Without effec-
tive and reliable means of replacing the organization’s leaders if they 
do not act in the best interests of the broader community, the semi-
democratic structure affords no recourse in the event of capture. In 
ICANN’s case, the board of directors may or may not have adequately 
represented the interests of the global Internet community. Whether or 
not the board has achieved representation with a minority of elected 
directors is irrelevant for this analysis; in the event that the board does 
not positively represent the Internet community, the community has 
no effective means of replacing those directors.
227 The only recourse 
available to the Internet community would be self-help. The Internet 
community could work around ICANN, either by building an alterna-
tive network or by ignoring its allegedly illegitimate authority.
228 
This fear of capture is ordinarily expressed in terms of corporate 
interests — or the loosely defined intellectual property constituency at 
large — taking control of the institution, leaving the broader commu-
nity without recourse. Corporations, both based in the United States 
and abroad, have demonstrated their s erious interest in ICANN. 
ICANN’s financial statements for the six-month period ending in De-
cember 2000 revealed that the ICANN corporation’s creditors include 
heavyweights Cisco Systems, Inc., Deutsche Telekom AG, Inc., MCI 
Worldcom,  Inc., and 3COM.
229 Several  board members, including 
                                                                                                    
226. Professor David Post describes this fear of capture without recourse in the language 
of checks and balances found in U.S.-style constitutional parlance. “Who wields this power, 
and what keeps them from exercising it arbitrarily and oppressively — are questions of the 
deepest importance for the continued development of a vibrant Internet.” Post, supra note 2. 
Post’s comments have particular resonance because ICANN’s semidemocratic structure has 
even fewer checks and balances than a traditional corporation. In the ordinary corporate 
form, if the directors act in a manner that is not considered to be in the best interests of the 
shareholders, the majority of shareholders have the ultimate recourse of voting the directors 
out of office. Likewise, under the administrative agency model, a process of judicial review 
provides such a check on the activities of the agency’s officials. No such ultimate power 
resides in the broader community of ICANN’s stakeholders, despite the founding docu-
ments’ insistence that the organization functions in a manner that is representative of the 
global community of Internet users. The only plausible check resides in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce’s ability to cut off its grant of authority through the MoU.  
227. One might argue that the Supporting Organizations structure, or the new Nominat-
ing Committee arrangement, allows for the community to represent itself. However, such a 
route is far from certain and lacks complete transparency. Also, the notion of who belongs 
to the Internet community is a problem that has long plagued ICANN. For instance, do 
governments and corporate interests stand on the same footing as domain name holders or 
yet further removed, non-domain-name-holding Internet users? 
228. The nascent challenge to ICANN presented by New.net, an alternative DNS initially 
backed by idealab! and others, might represent one such example of self-help. See Andy 
Patrizio,  New.net Defies Domain System,  WIRED.COM (Mar. 5, 2001),  at 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,42146,00.html. 
229. See ICANN, 6-MONTH FINANCIAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 DECEMBER 
2000 (Feb. 27, 2001), at http://www.icann.org/financials/financial-report-fpe-31dec00.htm. 
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chairman Vint Cerf and former At-Large  board representative Karl 
Auerbach, have been employed by two of these creditors during their 
respective terms as directors. In addition to creditors who supported 
ICANN during its cash-poor infancy, registrars and registries are re-
quired by contract to make payments to ICANN.
230 Also, the Regis-
trars make payments up to $3.5 million a year.
231 In light of these 
corporate loans and payments, the ACLU has made its position clear 
that ICANN’s structure presents a substantial risk of capture by cor-
porate interests.
232 
Two counterarguments undercut, but fail to mitigate completely, 
the fear of capture posed by the semidemocratic structure. First, the 
Supporting Organization structure may help to prevent capture by any 
given constituency and to ensure user input into  board decision-
making. The Supporting Organizations have traditionally sent nine of 
the nineteen directors to the board. Within the Supporting Organiza-
tions, individual Internet users, academics, and others play a substan-
tial role; through the Supporting Organizations, these arguably public-
spirited individuals may represent the community interest effectively 
when they elect directors and make potentially binding recommenda-
tions to the ICANN board. The new Nominating Committee process 
may assist in this fashion as well. However, while such individuals do 
participate in the ICANN governance system, there is no reason to 
believe either that they would have the ability to protect against cap-
ture, or that they would not be swayed to support those who would 
capture the organization. A second counterargument to the fear of 
capture centers on the fact that a semidemocracy is no more at risk of 
capture than any other authoritarian structure. While true on one level, 
the concern about semidemocracies and capture still stands. More-
over, the placative element of the semidemocratic structure may ren-
der participants less alert to the possibility of capture, potentially 
resulting in fewer measures designed to prevent the capture scenario. 
b. Second-Tier Concerns 
A series of secondary concerns regarding ICANN’s semidemoc-
ratic structure include the costs and inefficiencies of such a structure; 
the reduced ability of the organization to adapt to changing circum-
stances; the tendency toward nepotism rather than merit-based promo-
                                                                                                    
also suggests that ICANN has historically been literally indebted to a group of exclusively 
Western, and almost exclusively U.S.-based, entities. 
230.  See  Revised VeriSign Registry Agreement (Apr. 16, 2001),  at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/verisign. 
231. See id. 
232. See Letter from Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director of the ACLU, to Secretary 
Norman Mineta, U.S. Department of Commerce (Jan. 16, 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/ 
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tion, which reduces the quality of key actors over time; a reduced abil-
ity to handle the inevitable periods of transition effectively; and, po-
tentially, a lost opportunity problem.
233 
i. Cost and Inefficiency 
ICANN’s semidemocratic system brings with it a series of costs 
and few offsetting benefits. It is an essentially meaningless electoral 
system that costs ICANN the money that it paid to Election.com to 
outsource the election, ICANN’s own staff time, and the opportunity 
costs of the time and money devoted by ICANN and its supporters to 
the election process. The process also risks demoralizing the commu-
nity at large.
234 While a $200,000 grant from the Markle Foundation 
provided some support for the At-Large Membership election process, 
it did not cover all financial costs for tasks such as mailing 120,000 
letters.
235 The counterargument suggests that the cost to ICANN of 
running the At-Large Election is not great relative to its overall 
budget. However, the cost of enabling, but ignoring, public commen-
tary, while unknowable, is certainly a non-zero amount. In the event 
that any cost to an organization with a public function is allocated to 
an activity that may have a net negative impact to the organization or 
to the public at large, such a cost is unjustified. 
ii. Less Effective Reaction to Change 
ICANN’s semidemocratic structure may result in its management 
being less responsive to the need for change than a counterpart o r-
ganization with an effective representative mechanism. In the short 
term, semidemocracies fail to incorporate the need for change into 
real-time policy-making, as the lines of communication between the 
governed and the governors get pinched and become plagued by 
                                                                                                    
233. There are other concerns about semidemocracies that are not discussed in this Arti-
cle. One important concern is the argument that complex forms tend to be less stable than 
pure forms of governance, but the empirical evidence is unclear. See, e.g., Marc Stier, Is 
Democracy Stable? Compared to What?: A Preliminary Exploration,  at 
http://www.stier.net/writing/demstab/demstab.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2004). 
234. The sense of demoralization implied here is a variant of Professor Frank Michel-
man’s famous take on “demoralization costs” in the context of U.S. takings clause jurispru-
dence. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1183–1201 (1967).  
235. See ICANN, A Proposal to the Markle Foundation for Grant Support of ICANN’s 
At Large Membership and Election Program (Oct. 21, 1999),  at 
http://www.icann.org/committees/at-large/markle-proposal-21oct99.htm;  see  also Scribe’s 
Notes: ICANN Public Forum Yokohama Japan (July 15, 2000),  at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/yokohama/archive/scribe-icann-071500.html.  458   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
static.
236 In the long term, a semidemocracy is less able than authori-
tarian or democratic regimes to change its practices and its structure in 
needed ways to respond to changing times.
237 Professor Unger sug-
gests that certain forms of governance, which could include the semi-
democracy, exhibit this shrunken transformative ability.
238  
This shrunken transformative ability could manifest itself in a 
number of potentially damaging ways for ICANN. Semidemocracies, 
for instance, have a hard time recovering from a decline in the percep-
tion of the organization’s legitimacy of authority.
239 In the event that 
the election process is believed to be meaningful, the leaders can hold 
a legitimate election to begin the process of restoring belief and trust 
in the system.  Authoritarian leaders, by contrast, can act quickly to 
alter organizational structure by fiat or by making policy decisions to 
restore a belief in their legitimacy of authority.
240 The leaders of the 
semidemocracy have at their disposal neither the surer path of the true 
democracy, nor the efficient path of the true authoritarian, to address a 
crisis of legitimacy. In light of the substantial policy changes that 
ICANN has made in its short history, thus far this concern of 
shrunken transformative ability does not seem to be acute for 
ICANN.
241 However, if ICANN moves further away from the authori-
tarian model, this concern will become more pertinent.  
iii. Danger of Nepotistic, Rather Than Meritocratic, Promotion 
The promotion of new directors in a semidemocratic system is 
more likely to be based on nepotism than on merit-based considera-
tion.
242 ICANN’s critics are particularly attuned to this danger given 
the organization’s history. The initial members of the board were ap-
                                                                                                    
236. An organization like ICANN that extensively uses advanced information and com-
munications technologies might be less prone to such a problem than less technologically 
inclined organizations. 
237.  But  see Posting of Joe Sims,  Joe_Sims@jonesday.com, to  comment-
bylaws@icann.org (Oct. 23, 1999),  at  http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/ 
comment-bylaws/msg00025.html (arguing that ICANN may not want to be able to change 
quickly: “This objective [maintaining the stability of the DNS] requires slower, not faster, 
decision-making and incremental change.”).  
238. See UNGER, supra note 217, at 265. 
239. See Alagappa, supra note 209. 
240. See id. at 35 (discussing East and Southeast Asian authoritarian regimes which rely 
on economic development as a main source of their legitimacy).  
241. Consider, for instance, the several versions of appointing board members over the 
past five years: from the initial “divine right of kings approach,” to a process primarily 
involving the Supporting Organizations, to a semi-elected board, to a non-elected board, and 
finally to a revamped Nominating Committee procedure for those board members not nomi-
nated through the Supporting Organization process. See ICANN, ICANN Nominating Com-
mittee,  at  http://www.icann.org/committees/nom-comm (last modified Dec. 5, 2003) 
(describing current system for appointment).  
242.  See  ALEXANDER  A.  GALKIN,  AUTHORITARIANISM IN  RUSSIA:  DANGERS FOR 
DEMOCRACY  (1999), at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/galkin.pdf. No. 2]  The End of the Experiment  459 
 
pointed by one man, Jon Postel, or at most by a small group of insid-
ers with a vested interest in the composition of the  board.
243 In a 
semidemocracy, the community at large has little or no recourse when 
nepotism is used to appoint people who do not act in the best interests 
of the community. A simple cost-benefit analysis suggests that the 
appointer may choose a leader based on allegiance if the potential 
benefits of future decisions outweigh the community’s outrage. For 
ICANN, this may not be a severe problem. The track r ecord of 
ICANN’s appointments has been laudable, given the talent and com-
mitment (albeit not perfect diversity) of the  board’s membership.
244 
Moreover, the structures of the supporting organizations may result in 
greater consideration of merit in the  board appointment process. 
However, this concern remains valid to the extent that the ICANN 
structure provides few safeguards to prevent nepotistic rather than 
meritocratic promotion.  
The relative homogeneity of leaders in a semidemocratic structure 
tracks this concern about nepotism holding the upper hand. One of the 
hallmarks of well-run democracies is the variety of leaders with dif-
ferent qualities who assume positions of influence. This diversity of 
strengths is less likely to be the case in semidemocracies or authoritar-
ian regimes. For ICANN, this theoretical tendency toward homogene-
ity is in direct conflict with ICANN’s mandate to represent the global 
community of Internet users.
245 Diversity of ethnic, cultural, geo-
graphic, professional, or other backgrounds may result both in a better 
policy and a greater likelihood that the world’s Internet users are truly 
being represented in ICANN. Given ICANN’s global reach and 
founding principles, this inclination of semidemocracies against fos-
tering such diversity should be taken seriously.
246 
iv. Transitions Are Handled Clumsily 
Semidemocracies struggle with transitions. ICANN is no excep-
tion to that rule. Political scientists believe that democracies manage 
                                                                                                    
243. Given the timing of Postel’s death, it is almost certain that Joe Sims, the influential 
counsel to ICANN, played a significant role in the initial board’s make-up. 
244. Some ICANN critics complain that corporate interests are too well represented at 
the expense of the Internet user community. See,  e.g., Reclaimthe.net, Is the ICANN 
$50,000.00 TLD Application Fee a Scam?, at http://reclaimthe.net/icann/scam/ (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2004). 
245. One could argue that ICANN has done an admirable job of avoiding homogeneity. 
However, the point that I am making is theoretical rather than historical.  
246. ICANN has faced a serious diversity problem since its founding. One prevalent cri-
tique of ICANN has been the dearth of involvement from people in developing countries. 
ICANN has made enormous efforts in this particular regard, led by Chief Policy Officer 
Andrew McLaughlin, who is an expert in information and communications technologies in 
developing nations.  See  Andrew McLaughlin,  at  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
mclaughlin.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2004). The recently-announced Nominating Commit-
tee process is meant in part to address this substantial concern. 460   Harvard Journal of Law & Technology  [Vol. 17 
 
to achieve orderly, scheduled transitions better than semidemocracies 
or authoritarian regimes.
247 A  semidemocratic transition often i n-
volves a two-step by the existing leaders: to act open enough to ap-
pease those who seek involvement and openness, but also to act 
quickly and decisively enough to effect the necessary or desired trans-
fer of power. In ICANN’s case, this failure to make transitions 
promptly and elegantly has manifested itself in the organization’s first 
several years of operation. For i nstance, after one or two years, the 
original appointed board was intended to be replaced by a board cho-
sen half by the Supporting Organizations and half by the member-
ship.
248 However, three of the original  board members remained on 
the board for over five years.
249 The semidemocratic structure lends 
itself to more awkward transitions than its pure-structural counter-
parts. ICANN has shown no likelihood of overcoming the transitional 
problems of its semidemocratic structure, even as the December 15, 
2002, board transition raised precisely these concerns. 
C. The Semidemocratic Structure Does Nothing to Address ICANN’s 
Legitimacy of Authority Problem 
Even if none of political theory’s predictions come to pass, a 
semidemocratic structure still hurts ICANN because it fails to address 
ICANN’s most pressing problem: the public perception that ICANN 
lacks legitimacy of authority.
250 A compelling articulation of an o r-
ganization’s legitimacy is critical for the organization’s ability to 
carry out its mandate.
251 ICANN’s hybrid structure gives it none of 
the authority of its component parts: its formal top-down decision 
structure takes away the standards  body’s legitimacy through true 
openness, its corporate structure takes away the democracy’s legiti-
macy through true representation, and its principles of openness and 
representation take away the corporation’s legitimacy through author-
ity and efficiency. To the extent that ICANN’s power flows from an 
agreement with the United States, ICANN will continue to face i n-
creasing difficulty in credibly asserting its authority in an international 
                                                                                                    
247. One can profitably compare the transfer of power within a corporation to the trans-
fer of power in a state. This analogy is p articularly informative for ICANN, because in 
many ways ICANN operates like a state. See supra Section II.B.3.  
248. See generally Froomkin, supra note 218 (discussing the board’s failure to transfer 
power within a one- to two-year timeframe as originally anticipated). 
249. The three original members who remained on the ICANN board until June 2003 are 
Hans Kraaijenbrink, Jun Murai, and Linda Wilson. See ICANN, Board of Directors,  at 
http://www.icann.org/general/board.html (last modified Feb. 24, 2004). 
250. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 212–17. 
251. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991) (discussing the importance of legitimacy of author-
ity within democratic states); ROUSSEAU, supra note 103, at 454–58 (describing the source 
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context. To the extent that the authority flows from the Internet user 
community, its confusing organizational form and semidemocratic 
structure will likely undermine any sense that the broader community 
is involved in an open decision-making process and voluntarily ceding 
power to a representative  board.  Most likely, what little authority 
ICANN has flows from a complex — and possibly u nknowable —
combination of sources: from Jon Postel, from the U.S. government, 
from the many constituencies who use the Internet, and from the 
Internet community as a whole.
252 However, retention of the semi-
democratic form will slow this flow to a trickle, especially as the 
Internet community continues to become disengaged in the decision-
making process and literally disenfranchised.   
The final, and most controversial, concern related to ICANN’s 
semidemocratic structure is that the Internet community never b e-
comes actively involved in the management of the DNS or other func-
tions that ICANN is intended to address.
253 The heart of the 
experiment in using the Internet to create legitimacy through openness 
and representation is the belief that the Internet community as a whole 
can best determine how to govern themselves. However, in a semi-
democratic structure, where individuals are able to participate in the 
process but never have decision-making authority or take on real re-
sponsibility, the Internet community never comes into its own. As one 
political theorist puts it, “In the domain of public affairs people could 
never outgrow their childhood.”
254 ICANN has entered its awkward 
teenage phase a few years early and is in danger of never reaching the 
full potential of its adulthood. 
On the simplest level, this problem represents a lost opportunity 
to develop, through ICANN, a model to govern the technical architec-
ture of the Internet. While ICANN is not intended to foster global de-
mocracy, its founding principles state explicitly that it is i ntended to 
achieve a representative system for coordinating the Internet. The 
stronger form of the argument is that ICANN is meant to demonstrate, 
as the IETF did before it, that Internet users are capable of governing 
themselves. If individual members of the Internet community never 
take on responsibility for ICANN’s work, political scientists predict 
the community will never come to participate in a responsible manner. 
ICANN’s authority figures would continue to bear full responsibility 
                                                                                                    
252. Herbert Burkert, in a short piece about ICANN and legitimacy, posits that its author-
ity is grounded in three sources: the At-Large Membership, interest groups, and national 
governments. See Herbert Burkert, Responsibility for ICANN — Stability and Legitimacy 
(Feb. 4, 2001), at http://www.atlargestudy.org/Zurich-E.pdf. 
253. In some senses, this “lost opportunity” point is Professor Froomkin’s main thrust in 
Habermas. See Froomkin, supra note 33. ICANN, given its special claim to legitimacy and 
its global reach, ought to, but does not, pass Habermas’s demanding test. 
254. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 105 (1989); see also GALKIN, su-
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for the organization’s activities without the benefit of an engaged 
global community of Internet users. This loss to ICANN would mean 
it would lose the active participation of people who might volunteer 
their time or present useful ideas. Such active participation might help 
develop the legitimacy of authority that ICANN has lacked since its 
founding. In short, ICANN might never become the truly representa-
tive body that its founding principles suggest it ought to be. 
This lost opportunity might also have other ramifications across 
cyberspace. To date, the Internet has been effectively self-regulated in 
particular areas that traditional jurisdictions fail to reach.
255 In Bar-
low’s cyberspace, for instance, Internet users self-govern to the extent 
that governance is necessary at all.
256 A lthough Barlow’s corners of 
the Internet eroding, sovereign governments have yet to reach many 
unregulated online communities, such as Usenet groups, discussion 
forums, and the “darknet.”
257 If the Internet community does not as-
sume the responsibility it was intended to have in ICANN, it may 
never mature into a vibrant self-governing entity. 
Worse than preventing the Internet community from coming into 
its own, the ICANN semidemocratic structure may result in mass frus-
tration and a “checking out” on the part of rational Internet commu-
nity members. Rational choice theory suggests that voters make a 
calculation when they decide whether or not to vote.
258 A s André 
Blais notes, “[The voter] decides to vote if, in her view, the benefits of 
voting are greater than the costs; if, on the contrary, the costs are 
greater than the benefits, she decides not to vote.”
259 Semidemocracies 
suffer a rational choice theory problem. In the first election, partici-
pants may not recognize that the benefits of voting are outweighed by 
their time and effort spent to vote. However, in the event that their 
elected representatives fail to represent them well because of flaws in 
the election process, those same participants becoming increasingly 
unlikely to vote in subsequent elections.  
Despite its shortcomings, rational choice theory has relevance to 
the effect of ICANN’s semidemocratic structure on the Internet com-
munity. Rational choice theory is far from a perfect explanation of 
voting choice decisions. It fails to address the  “paradox of voting”: 
even when participants could not rationally believe that their vote 
matters, large numbers of people still turn up at the polls.
260 Nonethe-
                                                                                                    
255. For instance, consider standards-setting bodies like the IEEE and the W3C. 
256. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
257.  See  PETER  BIDDLE  ET AL.,  THE  DARKNET AND THE  FUTURE OF  CONTENT 
DISTRIBUTION, at http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc (last visited Feb. 24, 
2004).  
258. See ANDRÉ  BLAIS, TO  VOTE OR  NOT TO VOTE: THE MERITS AND LIMITS OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 1 (2000). 
259. Id. 
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less, elements of rational choice theory have merit. Rational voters 
use some calculus in determining whether to participate in an election. 
For many voters, one factor in that calculus is whether or not their 
vote may have an impact now or in the future. In ICANN’s case, to 
the extent that voters believe that their vote could not possibly have an 
impact on the outcome of DNS coordination, rational actors will de-
cide not to vote in future Internet-based elections. 
Several outcomes follow from rational apathy besetting ICANN’s 
elections and other forms of participation. ICANN may suffer if the 
“rational” Internet users do not vote but the  “irrational” do vote. If 
only the irrational voters vote, they will elect representatives from the 
fringes of the Internet community. Participation of fringe candidates 
on ICANN’s board may result in transaction costs without any offset-
ting benefits to the organization from their work. Another potential 
side effect of mass frustration is factionalization, which was one  of 
the key fears of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.
261 Faction ensues 
because of the fractionalization of the voting populace, which is artifi-
cially limited by rational voters deciding not to vote. A third possible 
outcome is that when rational voters stop  participating, ICANN’s 
board and managers lose touch with large segments of the Internet 
community and therefore have no chance of acting in a representative 
fashion. By keeping the lines of communication open b etween the 
community and ICANN, those who care about ICANN will spend less 
time complaining and more time working together to solve common 
problems. Just as important, these placative politics result in a disen-
gaged politics, the opposite of an energized politics. An energized 
politics is desirable because it engages a high-level of civic involve-
ment and serves as an antidote to impasse in tough situations.
262 Fi-
nally, the less impact that voting has on decision  making and the 
fewer rational voters who participate, the less efficiently the organiza-
tion can incorporate public input. 
The lost opportunity argument against a semidemocratic ICANN 
is vulnerable to attack because ICANN’s disenfranchisement of the 
broader Internet community is not, in actuality, a lost opportunity. The 
average Internet user has limited technical knowledge compared to the 
average ICANN staff person or board member. Even in the aggregate, 
the Internet community is unlikely to contribute to the process of ful-
filling ICANN’s mandate. ICANN’s staff and board might make bet-
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famous articulation of the fear of faction and its possible causes and effects; Madison, how-
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262 See UNGER, supra note 217, at 263–77 (describing the impact and importance of a 
high-energy politics). A high-energy politics is one of the original promises of the Internet, 
according to many observers from the political sciences. See James F. Moore, The Second 
Superpower Rears Its Beautiful Head,  at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/jmoore/ 
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ter decisions without the distraction of extensive commentary from an 
astonishingly fragmented user community. Moreover, ICANN is not 
intended to foster global democracy; its job is to perform a technical 
coordination and care-taking function.
263  
This critique, however, incorporates at least three presumptions 
that may not be accurate. First, the critique presumes that those ap-
pointed into positions of responsibility will be more talented and more 
capable of carrying out ICANN’s mandate than other members of the 
Internet community. Second, this critique presumes that appointed 
members would be both willing and able to understand and represent 
the broader community in the decision-making process absent any 
apparent controls to keep them in check. Third, this critique presumes 
that ICANN’s role is purely technical and that ICANN’s exercise of 
authority lacks any meaningful social impact. In addition, this critique 
of the lost opportunity argument fails to consider that ICANN relies 
heavily on volunteers. If more-capable volunteers opt out based on 
their calculus that they do not wield meaningful influence, ICANN 
will suffer because it will only be able to draw upon less-capable vol-
unteers. Finally, in the semidemocratic structure, ICANN’s leaders 
will still have to address i nput from the broader community, but 
unlike a situation of energized politics, that input will include fewer 
good ideas and creative solutions. 
The lost opportunity problem is, however, ultimately unsatisfying 
as a critique of ICANN, because it assumes that ICANN is the body to 
prove that the Internet can govern itself. True, the broad principles set 
forth in its founding documents give rise to the plausible reading that 
ICANN bears a responsibility for proving the Internet’s ability to cre-
ate more responsive, democratically  governed, global institutions. 
Several years into the experiment, however, it is clear that ICANN is 
not the right institution to prove such a point. ICANN, throughout its 
history, has tried to do too much; consequently, it has been unable to 
do anything as well as it might have done. As intriguing as the ex-
periment of creating democratic governance via the Internet is, 
                                                                                                    
263. Joe Sims, ICANN’s outside counsel, wrote in a posting to the ICANN Web site:  
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processes of ICANN, the more risk to the prime objective of contin-
ued stability, and the more pressure there will be for the only realistic 
alternative: control of ICANN by some form of multi-national body, 
where we would likely get stability all right, but combined with more 
control[,] less freedom[,] and less innovation. The fact that the global 
community of national governments has so far allowed and even en-
couraged this private sector approach is quite remarkable, and owes 
great credit to the United States government for its leadership in this 
regard, but this forebearance [sic] is neither pre-ordained nor guaran-
teed. 
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ICANN  should relinquish the experiment to an organization more 
capable of achieving success. Once free from the burden,  ICANN 
should be restructured to the form most effective at achieving its core 
mission: the management of the DNS. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“[G]LOBAL AND NATIONAL P OLITICS, AND THE HONEST SEARCH FOR THE BROADEST 
POSSIBLE CONSENSUS O F ALL INTERESTED STA KEHOLDERS, HAVE COMBINED TO PRODUCE 
AN ICANN DRAFTED BY COMMITTEE. AS COULD BE EXPECTED, THE RESULT IS NOT A 
PERFECT INSTRUMENT FOR ANYTHING, INCLUDING ITS PRIME OBJECTIVE [TO MAINTAIN THE 
STABILITY OF THE DNS].” JOE SIMS, ESQ. (OUTSIDE COUNSEL TO ICANN; PARTNER, JONES, 
DAY)
 264 
The best way to manage the DNS, and the best way to prove that 
the Internet user community can be involved in the decision-making 
process on issues of global importance, are not one and the same.
265 
These two issues have been conflated in the d ebate over ICANN’s 
legitimacy of authority. ICANN’s failure to create legitimacy through 
representation and openness means that its structure ought to be re-
formed to achieve its narrow  technical  mandate. Regardless of 
whether ICANN can endure as a technical body, the community as a 
whole is left with the continuing need to establish a compelling theory 
for the governance of the technical aspects of the global Internet. 
Three key points emerge from this analysis of ICANN’s experi-
ment in governance structures. First, with a goal toward selecting the 
organizational structure most suited to its narrow mandate ICANN 
must move away from its semidemocratic phase, and continue to pur-
sue substantial structural reform — more substantial than the marginal 
reforms proposed by ICANN’s leadership to date. Second, ICANN 
should clarify the way in which users can meaningfully involve them-
selves in the decision-making process to mitigate the risk of demorali-
zation and to get the most out of the input offered by the Internet user 
community in a manner that is constructive rather than distracting. 
Such reform should make sure that individuals know the extent to 
which their participation through various channels will be considered 
by the decision maker. Third, we need to look past ICANN’s troubled 
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might in fact render the organization for which I work vulnerable to the accusation that it 
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story and toward emerging issues of how to govern the technical ar-
chitecture of the Internet in an increasingly networked world.
266 
A. ICANN Should Pursue Meaningful Structural Reform 
ICANN’s structural reform could proceed in  several possible 
ways.  Least likely, ICANN could become  truly representative and 
open, either through further empowering “shareholders” within the 
corporate structure or by adopting a new institutional format. Through 
either the A t-Large Advisory Committee,
267  Nominating  Commit-
tee,
268 or otherwise,
269 ICANN could give the user community greater 
voice in the decision-making process, moving the organization closer 
to the Internet user community, and farther from corporate interests 
and the  U.S. government. The Election of 2000, despite its glitches, 
suggests that global online elections might be operationally feasible. 
Presuming increased interest in public participation, the remaining 
concerns about a uthentication and security can be overcome with 
study and refinement. In the same way that a government could move 
from autocracy to democracy, so too could ICANN  change from a 
corporation with an appointed board to a global organization with a 
purely elected board (or at least a board whose members represent a 
specific constituency through the S upporting  Organizations). 
ICANN’s charter, by-laws, and founding documents provide no e x-
plicit road map to guide such a transition, and the trend suggests 
movement in precisely the opposite direction. The board would have 
to readjust ICANN’s by-laws in order to morph the organization into a 
more representative body.  
A move by ICANN to a model with greater user involvement — 
including but not limited to becoming a representative democracy — 
would have certain advantages, particularly in terms of establishing 
greater legitimacy. The structure of ICANN would almost certainly 
become aligned more directly with the grounding principles of repre-
sentation and openness. If ICANN could overcome the problem of the 
legitimacy of authority, the Internet community might well develop 
into an energized, engaged global force — a development that could 
have numerous side benefits, both for ICANN and for global society 
at large. It is at best unclear, however, that the result of a purely de-
mocratic structure would be an organization better able to fulfill its 
                                                                                                    
266. See Kleinwaechter, supra note 107, at 1124 (arguing that “[w]e live in a transitional 
period where the old governance system, rooted in the concept of the sovereign nation-state, 
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267. See ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee, supra note 21. 
268. See ICANN Nominating Committee, supra note 241. 
269. See, e.g., CTR. FOR GLOBAL STUDIES, ENHANCING LEGITIMACY IN THE INTERNET 
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core mission: maintaining the stability of the Internet. It is similarly 
unclear that the constituencies currently represented in ICANN would 
be fully represented, a concern that may be mitigated by the fact that 
they could be represented by their individual members.
270 Also, cer-
tain very important issues that ICANN addressed have not attracted 
substantial public commentary, despite  a substantial amount of par-
ticipation on other issues.
271 A purely representative democracy is far 
from a perfect answer, at present, to the question of the best structure 
for ICANN. In addition, there is no meaningful movement in favor of 
adopting a more democratic model, making such a reform highly 
unlikely, even were it desirable. 
At the center of the possibilities spectrum — and least appealing 
of all — ICANN could opt to maintain the awkward status quo, de-
spite continued political opposition to its current structure.
272  Mr. 
Lynn’s proposed reforms of February 24, 2002, and the reform efforts 
pursued by the board since that time, though substantial in their own 
way, would fit in this band of the spectrum.
273 The NGO and Aca-
demic ICANN Study and At-Large Study Committee reports of 2001, 
though critical of ICANN and urging further involvement of the user 
community at large, also supported variations of the hybrid  status 
quo.
274 The perils of the semidemocratic structure are substantial and 
well-documented.  To the extent that ICANN perpetuates a semi-
democratic structure, its leaders would be well advised to consider, 
and seek to avoid, the pitfalls that political scientists and historians 
predict for semidemocratic institutions.  Changes at the margins of 
ICANN’s structure, or even a heightened awareness of the structure’s 
flaws, may mitigate or even prevent certain adverse consequences 
from coming to pass. The attention paid to ICANN’s every move —
by members of the press, on Internet message boards and newsgroups, 
in e-mail-based newsletters such as the widely read Politech by C|Net 
reporter Declan McCullagh,
275 and weblogs by the likes of Bret 
                                                                                                    
270. This representation could work in one of two ways. If the corporate Internet inter-
ests, for instance, felt under-represented, they could organize their staff, shareholders, and 
other interested parties to vote in ICANN elections. Similarly, those interests could nomi-
nate their own staff to serve on the ICANN board, just as Karl Auerbach of Cisco Systems 
did during his term.  
271. See supra Section III.B. 
272. Given the statements of the U.S. Department of Commerce in September 2002 and 
September 2003 about the need for ICANN to change in order to comply with the terms of 
the MoU, a scenario with no further reform seems unlikely. See MoU 2002, supra note 5. 
However, the renewal of the MoU, with its continued emphasis on turning over the job of 
DNS management to the private sector, suggests that marginal reform within the current 
corporate structure may yet be likely. 
273. LYNN, supra note 131. Mr. Lynn stepped down after a two-year term, so his influ-
ence over future reforms is virtually nil. 
274. See NGO & ACADEMIC ICANN STUDY, supra note 16. 
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Fausett
276 and Dan Gillmor
277 — functions as a very important check 
on ICANN’s ability to act in a manner adverse to the interests of the 
global Internet community. This method of public awareness may be 
yet more effective if Internet users recognize the shortcomings of 
ICANN’s structure, such as the danger of capture, and adjust their 
monitoring behavior accordingly. 
Third, ICANN might move to a purely autocratic model. The ex-
isting board of directors might simply appoint new board members or 
extend their tenure as terms expire, pursuing a “divine right of kings” 
approach to governance. The At-Large Advisory Committee, Nomi-
nating Committee, and the Supporting Organizations could play a 
purely advisory role.
278 This approach would avoid some of the prob-
lems of semidemocracy, such as the added costs of functionally mean-
ingless elections, and the outside possibility of  “irrational” 
participants voting fringe  candidates onto the  board. This reversion 
would not solve ICANN’s  legitimacy  problem, would represent a 
back-tracking on core founding principles, would not include ade-
quate recourse in the event of capture or bad decision making, and 
would leave ICANN open to the critique that an opportunity to de-
velop an engaged global Internet community had been squandered 
completely. However, this autocratic approach might well be the most 
efficient way to structure ICANN in order to carry out its narrow 
technical mandate.  
ICANN has a fourth option as well, which is to explore a new 
model for the organization’s structure.
279 One often-mentioned option 
is to create a new multilateral treaty organization that would draw 
together all nations with an interest in the Internet  DNS into an 
agreement to establish an ICANN successor organization.
280  Simi-
                                                                                                    
276. Bret Fausett, ICANN.blog, at http://icann.blog.us (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). 
277. Dan Gillmor, E.Journal: News, Views and the Silicon Valley Diary, at http://web 
log.siliconvalley.com/column/dangillmor (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). 
278. Similarly, the Supporting Organizations could continue to select some board mem-
bers, though this approach would obviously retain an element of complexity.  
279.  See,  e.g., ELLIOT  NOSS ET AL., A  NEW APPROACH TO ICANN  REFORM: THE 
HEATHROW  DECLARATION  (Mar. 25,  2002),  at http://www.byte.org/heathrow/ 
heathrow-declaration-v0r0d5-032502.html (discussing reform proposals and new ideas for 
ICANN’s structure); ICANN, Links Concerning ICANN’s 2002 Evolution and Reform 
Process,  at  http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/links.htm  (last visited Feb. 7, 
2004) (providing an updated listing of proposals and ideas). 
280. On this topic, Professor Zittrain has written, 
[a]n international treaty organization is one possible way that gov-
ernments could come to agreement on how this particular aspect of 
the Internet should be run. My personal guess is that this would be the 
likely outcome if ICANN were to fail. It’s not clear to me that such 
an organization would make policies any more in touch with the 
Internet at large than a well-function[ing] ICANN can. More impor-
tant, as the historical context suggests, the power of the root derives 
from the fact that a critical mass of system administrators and “mir-
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larly, ICANN could be folded into an existing treaty organization un-
der the auspices of United Nations, such as the World Intellectual 
Property Organization.
281  An attractive variant of these proposals 
would be for such a treaty organization’s board to vest authority in a 
group of professional managers, and provide them with a fixed series 
of criteria for performance, while retaining the possibility of periodic 
removal.
282 
A multilateral treaty-based organization could help ICANN to es-
tablish its  legitimacy insofar as it would no longer be a California 
corporation operating under agreement with the U.S. Department of 
Commerce. However, a treaty-organization structure could bring with 
it additional bureaucracy, attendant transaction costs, and potentially 
some of the legitimacy of authority problems of the semidemocratic 
structure.
283 The treaty-organization model would give up on the no-
tion of the private sector leading, which might or might not be a large 
sacrifice. More worrisome, this approach would remove the decision-
making process further from the Internet user, unless creative mecha-
nisms were developed to incorporate feedback from the Internet user 
community and NGOs. Such an outcome would fail to achieve the 
goal of creating “more pluralistic models for Internet governance,” as 
Zoë Baird, President of the Markle Foundation, has forcefully a r-
gued.
284 In the event that ICANN were to shift to a treaty-based model 
or to a more traditional structure with cleaner lines and crisper deci-
sion-making processes, the experimental nature of ICANN would 
surely be lost. However, the result of such a governance structure 
might well, on balance, be best for the Internet and its users. 
M. Stuart Lynn was right: “ICANN needs reform: deep, meaning-
ful, structural reform, based on a clearheaded understanding of the 
successes and failures of [ICANN’s history to date].”
285 The U.S. De-
partment of Commerce echoed this sentiment, stating that “finalizing 
the future shape of ICANN is an urgent priority.”
286 However, incre-
mental change, such as the change proposed by President Lynn and 
others after him, offers only the prospect of incremental improvement 
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281. See World Intellectual Prop. Org., About WIPO, at http://www.wipo.org/about-
wipo/en/overview.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). 
282. The description of such a model is a fitting subject for another paper. The advan-
tages of a system of this sort include grounding ICANN in an agreement that includes mul-
tiple states rather than a single state. Another advantage could be a more direct alignment of 
the interests of the Internet user community with the managers and board, while retaining 
some element of private sector involvement, as sought by the founders. 
283. Those who administer related systems, such as the telephone number system, for the 
ITU, would almost certainly disagree with this critique of the treaty-organization model, 
citing their own relative efficiency. 
284. Zoë Baird, Governing the Internet: Engaging Government, Business, and Nonprof-
its, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2002, at  15. 
285. LYNN, supra note 131. 
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to an organizational structure in need of true overhaul. Joe Sims, too, 
is surely correct: not only was ICANN drafted by committee, but this 
problem plays out in Technicolor in ICANN’s structure and in the 
problems raised by ICANN’s apparent lack of clarity around the i s-
sues of representation and openness.
287 The relentless focus on proc-
ess,  from the moment ICANN was founded, rather than on the 
substance of its mission,  has been and continues to be counter-
productive. Sooner rather than later, ICANN should break with its 
history and seek an organizational structure that is at once true to its 
principles and capable of enabling its managers to achieve their core 
mission: preserving the stability of the Internet. And sooner rather 
than later, the question of what to do about ICANN’s crisis ought to 
be separated from both the effort to build stronger democratic institu-
tions using Internet technologies,
288 and the continued search for a 
compelling mode of governance for the technical architecture of the 
Internet. 
B. ICANN Should Clarify Its Governing Principles and Ensure that 
Users Know How Best to Participate and How, If at All, They Will Be 
Heard 
ICANN has done a laudable job of enabling the global Internet 
user community to offer input, but has done a poor job of making 
clear how the decision-making process works and the precise role of 
user input in that process. The process has shifted constantly and all 
but the most attentive followers lose track of the latest changes. If the 
proper way for users to have a meaningful voice in the process is 
through the Supporting Organizations, that guidance should be made 
clear to users. If commentary to the public forums is unlikely to play a 
role in decision making, users should be made completely aware of 
this fact. By continuing to mislead users about the extent to which the 
process is open, and the extent to which user input affects decision 
making, ICANN risks further demoralization of the global Internet 
community. Even if the answer is that users ought to find other ways 
to participate in the technical governance of the Internet, such an an-
swer would be better than a regime of placative politics with lip ser-
vice toward, but no meaningful consideration of, user input. 
Openness, in the sense of clarity of process, should be a critical start-
ing point of any structural reform. 
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ICANN’s structure must ultimately reflect the principles and 
goals that the global Internet community sets forth for it, or else reset 
expectations for what ICANN is meant to accomplish.
289 If ICANN is 
intended to be a dynamic, experimental, energizing organization that 
fulfills a critical function for a global public resource, its organiza-
tional structure should be altered to reflect those intentions. If ICANN 
is intended to be a simple not-for-profit focused on a narrow man-
date — unencumbered by higher-minded principles and goals — then 
the organizational structure should be simplified to reflect those inten-
tions. The current hybrid structure seems to please virtually no one. 
This outcome, Joe Sims notes, may be the necessary result of com-
promise.
290 Most troubling, though, the current hybrid structure, even 
absent the five elected directors, serves to frustrate ICANN’s ability to 
live up to its founding principles, obscures the user community’s abil-
ity to understand how best to participate in the decision-making proc-
ess, and risks continued alienation of the broad Internet community. 
ICANN is fascinating as an experiment in ways to achieve the goal of 
representation and input of the global community of Internet users, 
but it must at some point settle into an organizational structure with a 
predictable, sustainable process of governance on which stakeholders 
can rely for the purposes of determining a rational investment of time 
and resources. 
 C. We Ought to Turn Our Focus Away from ICANN and Toward  
Developing a Compelling Model for Governance of the Technical 
Architecture of the Internet 
Our attention should turn away from how ICANN is managed and 
toward the broader issue of how we govern those elements of the 
technical architecture of the Internet that have greater interest to the 
majority of Internet users.
291  ICANN was the wrong  test case for 
proving that the Internet could foster global democracy. We should 
look to the ICANN experiment in global democratic governance for 
lessons to guide future a ttempts to use the Internet to foster more 
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open, representative, and legitimate institutions that draw upon civil 
society and the Internet community at large.
292  
A new generation of global organizations, charged with mandates 
covering compelling subject matter and making use of Internet tech-
nologies, might yet emerge.
293 ICANN, doomed by its own tortured 
history and limited by the inaccessibility of its subject matter, as sug-
gested throughout this analysis, is highly unlikely to become a model 
of this sort and should no longer be looked to as a beacon, unless it 
undergoes truly meaningful reform. 
To the extent that governments, standards bodies, corporations, or 
new genres of organizations seek to use the Internet to strengthen 
global public involvement in their decision making, the participants’ 
involvement clearly should be meaningful, not placative, and u sers 
should be able to understand how and to what extent their input is 
considered.
294 The failure of the ICANN experiment bears with it a 
threat: that the Internet cannot and will not live up to its promise to 
invigorate democracies and  to achieve  broad representation within 
organizations. That message is not the right message to take from the 
ICANN story, but continued failures of this sort would threaten to 
turn this mistaken belief into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The global Internet community still faces the hard questions that 
faced us in 1998 as ICANN came into being: who governs the Internet 
and how? Can, and should, Internet users govern themselves? What is 
the role of traditional sovereigns and of powerful market players? If 
                                                                                                    
292. Professor Froomkin assesses some of the lessons learned from ICANN but carries 
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the private sector is still to lead, the private sector must learn to part-
ner effectively with governments and civil society and to lead in a 
manner that guarantees meaningful public participation.  Together, 
these parties should seek to develop new, open, and transparent gov-
ernance models. Internet technologies still hold promise in terms of 
making new models possible and effective, though we ought to learn 
from the ways in which ICANN’s use of methods such as simple bul-
letin boards, e -mail listservs, and direct election of board members 
has come up short. The failure of ICANN to live up to its founding 
principles calls renewed attention to the need for experimentation in 
using the Internet to foster stronger democratic institutions. ICANN 
needs to reboot, to establish a new set of principles for its operation, 
and to develop a structure from the ground up that enables it to carry 
out its narrow technical mandate. While it ought to be inclusive of the 
user community, ICANN should not be organized to prove a point 
about democracy on the Internet; as an organization that manages a 
technical function, and does not set standards or do much that inter-
ests or engages a broad swath of Internet users, ICANN is ill-suited to 
that end. Those who care about democracy and technology should 
shift their attention away from ICANN, which is almost certainly now 
beyond repair, and toward the many greener fields in cyberspace. 